

THE Commonweal



*ALL the ends of
the earth have seen the sal-
vation of our God; sing
joyfully to God all the
earth.*

*The Lord has made
known His salvation: He
has revealed His justice in the sight of
the Gentiles. Alleluia, Alleluia.*

*God, Who in diverse ways spoke in times
past to the fathers by the prophets, last of
all in these days has spoken to us by
His Son. Alleluia.* —Mass of the Octave of Christmas

New Blackfriars

SINCE OCTOBER, 1964, Blackfriars and Life of the Spirit have been amalgamated to form one monthly review. In an enlarged format New Blackfriars will extend the aims of its predecessors by providing an informed commentary on the many issues in the modern world that call for Christian scrutiny. It will use the resources of theology, not as a private language for specialists but as a contribution to a living debate that concerns us all.

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Faithful to the spirit of renewal within the Church, New Blackfriars is concerned not only with the inner life of Christians but demands, too, an honest response to the problem—in philosophy, the sciences, the arts and social and political affairs—of the times in which we live.

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THIS WEEK

EDITORIALS

- 435 Peace and Morality
- 436 Attack on Poverty
- 436 Funds for the States
- 437 The U.S. and Haiti

ARTICLES, FEATURES

- 438 The Pilgrim
by James O'Gara
- 439 Exegete at the Manger
by John L. McKenzie
- 442 Apprehensions About the Council
by Robert McAfee Brown
- 445 Liturgy and Action
by Peter J. Riga
- 450 One World, One Law?
by Mark R. MacGuigan

VERSE

- 449 Boy with a Hare
by Pablo Neruda
- 449 The Moment Before Silence
by Sister M. Simplicia, I.H.M.
- 449 January Night
by Robert Beum
- 449 On the Death of a Hermit Saint
by Giovanna Driscoll

DEPARTMENTS

- 453 The Screen
by Philip T. Hartung
- 454 The Stage
by Wilfrid Sheed
- 457 Books

THE COMMONWEAL

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THE COMMONWEAL

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

Peace and Morality

"PEACE" has always been a fighting word. For some, peace means the extermination of enemies. For others, it means the achievement of a nation's inner stability regardless of the cost to other nations. For most people, however, the word probably conveys little content: it is just another of those grand, abstract terms which have about them a vague aura of something desirable but forever elusive. A good word to shout, but hard to live by. Far from lessening the appeal of Christmas, however, the vagueness of the word makes it peculiarly attractive. We can give to the word whatever meaning makes us most happy that day; it is made to order for dreams.

But the achievement of peace in our world will not come about by Christmas dreams. Only the translation of dreams into reality will work; and that is where the trouble begins. In the abstract, peace would mean the harmonious and fruitful relationship of man with man, of nation with nation. In the concrete, to talk a different language, peace often enough means the unromantic business of adjusting private interests to the common good. And the common good, in turn, often means the satisfaction of as many private interests as possible. Life should not require this; but it does. Peace should mean more; but it often doesn't. When the Christian enters the real world, he too usually has to begin talking in such a pragmatic, hardly spiritual way. The world seems to know only the language of interests, of power, of negotiation, of pressure and of tactics. As for the moral and spiritual principles of Christianity, for what do they count? One would have to be blind to evidence to claim they make much difference.

As Dean Acheson argued in a recent speech, "[foreign policy] decisions are not helped by considering them in terms of sharing, brotherly love, the Golden Rule or inducting our citizens into the kingdom of heaven." These are hard words, seeming

to toss into the trash can some of the West's most touted values (though they are crudely put in Mr. Acheson's phrasing). Yet the point of his words is not to scorn values, but only to assert that foreign policy cannot be deduced from moral principles. The result will be mere moralizing, neither morality nor sound policy.

IT IS EASY to sympathize with Mr. Acheson's argument. His point has been made before, and better, by many Christian political thinkers. But where, then, does one insert values? Do they become totally irrelevant? Mr. Acheson's solution, it appears, is to frame one over-all goal, then measure the means to that end in terms of their practical utility. The goal he suggests is that of "creating an environment in which free societies may flourish and underdeveloped nations who want to work on their own development may find the means to do so." This he calls a "strategic approach," one which is neither moralistic nor machiavellian.

This is a tidy solution, but whether it will contribute to peace is debatable. The trouble with moral issues is that they don't disappear simply because they are labeled political, or diplomatic, or economic. Nor do they disappear by virtue of some sweeping initial moral commitment. "Nations," as Mr. Acheson points out, "are not individuals," drawing the pertinent conclusion that the standards for their conduct will necessarily be different from those of individuals. This is surely true, but that does not mean—as Mr. Acheson seems to imply—that nations should be less concerned with morality than individuals.

When Mr. Acheson says that "moral talk" did not bear on the decision whether, in 1949, to go ahead with production of a thermonuclear weapon, one has a right to be shocked. Here was a decision which had immense moral consequences, where the political and the moral issues were inextricably related. Mr. Acheson himself disavows the proposition "that

DECEMBER 25, 1964 435

some ends can justify anything." But why, then, wasn't the moral question raised whether the use of a thermonuclear bomb as a defensive weapon might be totally beyond any kind of moral justification? Some "moral talk" would well have been in order then, unless Mr. Acheson wants to assert that any talk of morality in the midst of concrete policy decisions is always and only moralizing. He doesn't say that, but his line of thought seems inexorably to tend in that direction.

That will not do. If there is ever to be a meaningful peace in the world, a peace of justice and order, then every political decision must have its moral dimension and context. Moralistic slogans are not morality, but then neither should a painful weighing of moral values be equated with sloganeering. This weighing will complicate the job of the statesman and government official; but better that problem than the complication of war and destruction.

Attack on Poverty

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S meeting with the first twenty volunteers for his war on poverty gave him a chance to outline their task. He spoke of a "more satisfying and more rewarding life" for such groups as dwellers in rural and city slums and the chronically unemployed. He cited such techniques as guidance, personal encouragement and the teaching of economically useful skills. Some rise in the national economic level should result when the hitherto destitute achieve self-support.

Even if the President succeeds in sending five thousand such volunteers into the field by 1966, this attack is hardly extensive enough to cope with the problem of American poverty. It is unequal to meeting the ravages of current unemployment, not to mention the added enforced idleness that will result from the present automation plans of American industry. Many of those newly trained or retrained by this laudable program will be unable to find openings for their new productive skills unless the national economy has in the meantime expanded at a wholly unforeseen rate.

If, however, something like the recommendations of the National Planning Association go into effect simultaneously with this "war on poverty," great social progress could result. Private industry finds the prospect of profit in meeting long-neglected public needs too obscure, while federal appropriations of the dimensions needed are opposed by Congress, many voters and all those who rightly fear putting such vast new operations in the hands of an omniscient bureaucratic national state. The NPA would put semi-public authorities, such as

those now operating ports and turnpikes, in charge of such programs as mass transit, urban renewal, desalinization, pollution control and special research, recreation and education programs. The vast capital required would be secured by selling bonds which would be paid off eventually from the increased tax revenues produced by such projects. To win the war against poverty, America will have to achieve economic expansion on an unprecedented scale, by supplying unmet public needs.

Funds for the States

WALTER Heller's scheme for the government to turn back automatically to the states a part of each year's federal income tax collections is an intriguing one. It combines into one unlikely package some of the pet ideas of liberal economists and conservative states' righters. For that reason, if President Johnson decides to include the plan in his legislative package for the coming year, it would seem to have at least a decent chance of winning congressional approval.

The idea behind the plan is to eliminate the built-in drag on the nation's economic growth: the tendency of tax receipts to rise so rapidly during times of expansion that the expansion is checked, sometimes to the point of recession. The problem, mitigated by last year's tax cut, is to "get rid of" accumulating tax money—to put it back in circulation where it can reinforce growth rather than check it.

One alternative way out is further tax cuts. But here the realities of politics intrude. Congress is unlikely to approve a cut on a large enough scale—the economic reactionaries point to the national debt, and the economic liberals are not happy about funneling the money into the private sector when so many public areas need expensive attention. Another obvious way out is for the federal government to simply spend the excess money. But here again there is a catch. Congress is unlikely to approve a rapid rise in expenditures. The President, with a mind to the Republican image of the Democratic party as a party of wild spenders, would probably draw back as well.

No one thinks the Heller plan is ideal or terribly efficient, but it does have the advantage of taking into account the various political problems and prejudices. With money channeled regularly back to the states, the burden on the state would be eased. Education—a primary concern of the federal government—stands to benefit appreciably, since much, if not most, of the feed-back funds would be spent by the states on schooling.

Of all the options, the Heller plan appears to be the safest. The packaging of states rights and public

spending should be enough to disarm a good many people. One difficulty, however, is Congress' reluctance to allocate any of its money without stiff safeguards over the spending of it. Closely related is the wide distrust of state governments. *Harper's* and *Commentary*, respectively, have recently run detailed and convincing articles on the corruption of the Illinois and Texas legislatures. Many others enjoy reputations that are almost as shady. In general state governments are narrow and backward; state legislators of any stature are usually lost quickly to national politics. There is also a downward spiral of public interest and publicity: the state governments do little to respond to the people's needs, so the people and the press show only passing interest in state government, which in turn provides many more opportunities for exploitation and corruption.

In the *New Republic*, Christopher Jencks argues that the dismal performance of the states, and their demonstrated irrelevancy to the problems of the day, are enough to scotch the Heller plan. Certainly there are good grounds for showing wariness toward the states. On the other hand it makes little sense to write off state government entirely, as Jencks seems to do. It may be the measure of the states' decline to have to say so, but state government is still a useful part of the national system of checks and balances. The Heller plan, properly administered, could improve the states' performance and awaken at least some of the popular interest necessary to make the system work. For arousing the people's attention, there is nothing like a gift of \$100 million or so.

The U.S. and Haiti

HAITI is a voodoo land, wildly beautiful and implacably cruel. It was cruel in its beginnings, the furious 1804 revolt of the blacks against their French master. It is cruel in its poverty. The highest birth rate in this hemisphere and the lowest per capita Gross National Product add up to desperation for the starving peasantry. But the heart of Haiti's cruelty is the regime which rules it. Since 1957, Dr. Francois Duvalier has entrenched himself in power by bribery, butchery, and a system of grassroots

terror implemented by the *Ton-Ton Macoute*, his half-Gestapo, half-militia private army. Duvalier and the *Ton-Ton Macoute* have gutted their country; about a third of Haiti's public revenue disappears directly into their pockets. Shake-down tactics and special tolls placed on major commodities have brought Haitian business to a standstill and have profited only Duvalier and his cronies. Nor has the immense amount of American aid—\$100 million since 1945—been able to free the land from either poverty or violence.

The United States' role in Haiti has been crucial since we intervened there militarily in 1915. For two decades, U.S. Marines constructed an underpinning for a modern Haiti; but the telephones and roads built then are now in disrepair and the carefully nurtured Haitian middle class dispersed. Our aid programs since 1945 have been successfully checkmated by Duvalier whenever there was danger of money or knowledge leaking through to the people. Members of the *Ton-Ton Macoute* were substituted for trained employees in U.S. projects, despite agreements to the contrary. Duvalier opposed even the U.S. military mission to Haiti once it became clear that the mission was interested in creating an honest, efficient, Haitian military and not merely an instrument of personal power.

The Duvalier regime does have its enemies. Rebel outbursts in the mountains and incursions across the border from the Dominican Republic are reported periodically. Cuba daily broadcasts two hours of anti-Duvalier, anti-American propaganda in Haitian Creole. The Organization of American States may be asked to enforce sanctions against Duvalier.

For a short time, during 1962 and 1963, it appeared the U.S. had joined the anti-Duvalier forces. Aid was cut off, missions were withdrawn, the dependents of U.S. officials were evacuated. Duvalier promptly retaliated by hinting that he might take up with the Soviets. And for this reason or some other, American policy once again changed course. "Correct" relations were established. President Johnson spoke of "close cooperation and solidarity with the government of Haiti." American advisors set to work preserving Haiti's precarious financial stability.

Gunboat diplomacy is not the only alternative for the U.S. to making a sorry peace with this voodoo totalitarian. Contact could be established, firmly and openly, with responsible anti-Duvalier forces, who are reportedly growing embittered over the recent American turnabout. The United States could put such economic pressure on Haiti as to send Duvalier's house of cards tumbling. To continue the present policy is to buy stability—and only short-run stability at that—at too high a price.

CHRISTMAS SCHEDULE

In accordance with growing magazine practice, The Commonweal will omit one issue during the Christmas season. The next issue will be that dated January 8. To all our readers, our very best wishes for a happy and holy Christmas.

THE EDITORS

The Pilgrim

THERE is no doubt that Pope Paul's visit to India was an historic occasion, and that it was successful beyond most expectations. There were no anti-Catholic demonstrations by Hindu extremists, and the Indians came out by the hundreds of thousands to see the *burru guru*, the great holy man from Europe.

The Pope went to India, he said, as a pilgrim, "a pilgrim of peace, of joy, of serenity and love." It was in this spirit that he was received, with throngs lining the streets to greet him everywhere he went. Said the pro-Communist, anti-Western weekly *Blitz*: "Other gods and goddesses, kings, commissars and presidents have been hailed and welcomed in the land of Gandhi, Nehru and peaceful coexistence. We have seen Eisenhower, Khrushchev and Chou, the Shah of Iran and the Queen of England, Nasser, Tito, Sukarno and others ride in glory through our capital and cities during the mighty Nehru epoch, but this humble pilgrim of God and Vicar of Christ got a reception which surpassed them all."

Pope Paul's own attitude clearly had much to do with the enthusiastic reception he received. "We greet all the Indian people," the Pope said, "every man, woman and child, and we extend our greeting to all nations of Asia, to every nation in the world. May they always remember that all men are brothers under the fatherhood of the Divinity, may they learn to love one another, to respect one another, to avoid violating the natural rights of others, may they ever strive to respect those rights in truth, in justice and in love." By his conduct in India Pope Paul did much to build an ecumenical bridge between Catholics and non-Christians and between Catholics and other Christians. "We love all men because they are all sons of God," the Pope said to those who greeted him on his return to Italy, "and you must do likewise."

Everywhere the Pope went he was surrounded, as is inevitable in India, by people, people, people; ranks of ten to fifty people walled in his car whenever he went abroad. And everywhere he went he inevitably ran into moving evidences of poverty in what Archbishop Roberts called the "nightmare slums" of Bombay, where the poor by the thousands sleep on the public pavement at night for lack of any better place.

Can the effect of the Pope's visit already be seen? Many think so, judging from his comments during an audience for reporters near the end of his stay in India. There Pope Paul urged an end to the arms race, calling on the nations of the world to "devote their resources and energies to fraternal assistance for developing countries." And the Pope went on to say: "If only every nation, thinking thoughts of peace and not

of affliction and war, would contribute even a part of its expenditure for arms to a great world fund for the relief of many problems of nutrition, clothing, shelter and medical care which afflict so many people."

Has the Pope enunciated new doctrine here, by way of his flying trip to the East? Obviously not, and those who do not want to follow the papal lead without such assurances will search for them in vain. What has he done, though, for those Catholics who are more open to his promptings? He has in one gesture dramatized the great gap between our expenditures on armaments and our expenditures on humanitarian causes; more fundamentally, he has directed our attention—and that of the moralists—to the largely unexplored question of the duties of the rich nations to the have-not nations of the world.

This year the United States will spend something like \$50 billion on national defense. Yet the entire Marshall Plan to rebuild shattered Europe cost approximately \$13 billion over a period of years. During the next few years it is estimated that our race for the moon will cost \$20 billion. At the same time the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations will try to wrestle with the problem of world starvation on a yearly budget of less than \$20 million (not billion). Supposedly sober and responsible men in and out of Congress denounce our foreign aid program as a giveaway, but in fact such help for others takes less than 1% of our gross national income.

I hope the Pope *was* overwhelmed by the teeming millions in India. Many Catholics treat the population problem as if it were an invention of the Church's enemies or dismiss it all too lightly. Yet there are serious estimates that in India alone 50 million children will die of malnutrition in the decade ahead. At least half the world's three billion people live in the state of nagging, constant hunger, at a time when there are a little over 3 billion people on earth; in less than 20 years there will be 4 billion and in less than 40, 6 billion.

More than 75% of these 6 billion people will live in Asia, Africa and Latin America. There the disparity between the rich nations and the poor is great, and it is growing greater all the time. The people of Europe and North America live in comparative plenty; the average American, for example, eats 4.66 lbs. of food a day, compared to 1.23 lbs. for the average Indian. And, in fact, *Newsweek* estimated recently that a pet dog in the United States eats more and better food than an Indian worker. As the Christian world prepares to celebrate Christmas in the Year of Our Lord 1964, this, I think, is the true significance of the Pope's pilgrimage.

JAMES O'GARA

Exegete at the Manger

JOHN L. MCKENZIE

WITH THE arrival of the Advent season and the Nativity-Epiphany cycle the interpreter of the Bible is tempted to crawl into his cave and remain there until some safe date like Septuagesima Sunday. The almost palpable dislike with which he is sometimes regarded is peculiarly acute at this season of the year. Too many people are convinced that exegesis is determined to destroy the historical reality of the events which are commemorated in the Nativity-Epiphany cycle. We have been asked by friends—half-seriously, I hope, but half—whether we can really take part sincerely in the celebration of these feasts. When the interpreter answers that he can, he is suspected of being a hypocrite.

Yet if the exegete flees, he is convinced that he is fleeing from an unjust attack. His studies of the infancy narratives of the Gospels have made the feasts of this cycle more meaningful rather than less. It is difficult to explain how this happens, but I believe I ought to try. If exegesis did not make the details of the Christ event more meaningful, it would have little right to claim attention in the Church. If interpreters cannot communicate their own sentiments to their fellow Catholics, they must suffer from unusually serious impediments in thought or speech or both.

Many people believe that modern interpreters deny or doubt the historical reality of the annunciation, the visitation, the song of the angels, the visit of the Magi, the killing of the Holy Innocents and the sojourn in Egypt. It is probable, some think, that interpreters also doubt the Virgin Birth and the Divinity of the Word, but do not yet dare to say this in public. The interpreter becomes the butt of jokes when the crib is set up in the Church or in the monastery; his permission to erect it is jocosely asked, or he receives apologies for the offense that the crib must give his scholarly instincts. The interpreter goes along with these witticisms, because no one survives very long in his business without a sense of humor. But he does not care to have people think that his area of learning is out of touch with Christian belief and Christian piety.

Any interpreter knows that the interpretation of the

infancy narratives is a piece of unfinished business. We do not yet have a satisfactory exegetical statement about the passages mentioned in the preceding paragraph; and it is just possible that the faithful ought to let interpreters finish the business which only interpreters can finish. It should no longer be necessary to argue—if it ever was necessary—that the details of the infancy narratives are not historical in the same sense in which the crucifixion of Jesus is historical. Our problem is to define the sense in which these narratives are historical. Possibly a more solidly founded solution would be open to criticism; but criticism could await the presentation of the solution.

A second and fairly important point is this: the historical reality of the birth of Jesus is not in question. It will be conceded, I trust, that the birth of Jesus is the basic historical reality on which other things repose. The significance of this event does not depend on the details of the narratives in which it is related. These details have their place, as I intend to point out; but it is poor theology to place the historical reality of the Magi on the same plane as the nativity of Jesus. No exegetical discussion with which I am acquainted has touched those truths which are properly called dogmatic; and it is quite without foundation to say that this is the direction in which exegetical thought is moving. As one whose professional business it is to maintain some familiarity with exegetical thought, permit me to say that it is not moving in this direction.

Within these general cautions, let us view the problems from another angle which may be new to many. The galleries of Europe are full of Nativity scenes painted by Christian artists; many of the finest of these scenes are used on our Christmas greeting cards. It is pedantic, no doubt, to point out that none of these scenes has any resemblance to the historical reality which they represent. The landscape is never Palestinian; it is usually Tuscan, because so many fine artists lived and worked in Florence. The buildings are likewise unmistakably Italian Renaissance. More than that, the figures in the paintings either wear fifteenth or sixteenth century costume or a costume never worn by anyone; and their features are the features of the people whom the artists knew. The ox and the ass at

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the crib come from Isaiah 1:3, not from the Gospels. Consciously or not, the artists have shown that the Nativity is an enduring event contemporary to all times by transferring it to their own country and time. They have thus expressed a profound theological truth; but to express it they have had to renounce any attempt at a historical representation. Nothing is lost here, for none of them was capable of a historical representation; and I think most of them knew it.

THIS TYPE of artistic treatment is regarded by no one as a distortion of the historical reality. Since the Magi cannot be painted in their proper costume, we could protest that they should appear simply as faces and not as figures. But the artist is allowed his liberties; and sometimes the more liberties he takes, the better we like him. We have learned that painting is more than photography, and that it conveys more of the meaning of that which it represents than photography can. Poetry too can open insights which sober and precise prose and statistics do not. The artist is helpless without the symbolism of art; if he is limited to that which can be verified historically, he cannot paint that which he most wants to paint: his own personal insight into the reality which he portrays. The face of Botticelli's Venus appears in some other paintings as the face of the Madonna. If one wished to be captious about this, one could make some incisive remarks about fidelity to the historical realities. For many people, the image of the Madonna is drawn from Botticelli.

There is a symbolism of literature as well as a symbolism of painting and sculpture. Imaginative literary symbolism is everywhere accepted as a part of conventional language; and there is no good reason why symbolism should not have its place in the Bible too. But the suggestion that this art form is found in the Bible is often greeted with suspicion as a covert attack upon the historical reality of the events of salvation history. Somewhere in this suspicion there lurks an affirmation that literary symbolism, legitimate in other writings, is not a legitimate form of expression in the Bible. This affirmation must be justified before any arguments can be founded upon it; and there is, of course, no justification for it. Literary symbolism does appear in biblical narratives; whether it is present or not in any particular passage is to be determined by an examination of the text, the context and the book and not by general judgment formed without references to the particular question.

Why should we think that there is literary symbolism in the infancy narratives? The interpreter holds that it is a sound principle to look for some symbolism when there are reasons for wondering whether the narrative before him is meant to be a simple recital of "facts." There are reasons for asking this about the infancy narratives. On the assumption that the infancy narratives

are a simple recital of fact, a certain number of serious historical problems arise which it is the interpreter's task to solve. It is impossible to deal with these problems in this limited space, but no one should talk glibly about the historical character of the infancy narratives unless he has at least recognized that these problems exist.

We have to explain how it is that Matthew and Luke are not only independent of each other, but why they cannot be harmonized. Matthew knows nothing of a previous residence in Nazareth, and Luke knows nothing of a killing of the Innocents and a flight into Egypt. Matthew knows nothing of a census, and there are good reasons why he should not; the only census of which we have knowledge was taken in Syria at a date which can in no hypothesis be adjusted to the date of the birth of Jesus, but which is too close to the probable date to allow us to suppose that another census was taken at the date which the narrative of Luke would demand. Josephus does not mention the killing of the Innocents; he was not the world's most careful historian, but he was deeply hostile to Herod, and it is absurd to suppose that he omitted the incident because of its Christian implications. Josephus has amply proved his ability to rewrite history in such a way that it serves his own purposes.

We have to explain the sources of Matthew and Luke; and while we are explaining this, we may deal with the question of why Mark's narrative begins with the baptism of Jesus. The picture of Luke sitting at the knees of Mary with his notebook in his hand is dear to devout tradition, but it has not a shred of foundation in historical evidence; it is a sheer assumption, no less sheer because it is devout. And if Luke sat at the knees of Mary for his information, Matthew must have been talking to someone else. There are other problems besides these; and one who asserts the pure historical character of the infancy narratives must deal with them. To dismiss them as irrelevant or to annihilate them by rewriting history is not candid.

The assumption that there is literary symbolism in the infancy narratives solves these problems; but a hypothe-



sis is not proved because it answers questions. I should add that it is not disproved because it answers questions either; but at the moment I am not trying to prove any hypothesis. The question here is simply whether there is room for a hypothesis. As long as the historical problems mentioned above remain unsolved, there is clearly room; and we may look for literary symbolism in the infancy narratives. But we cannot look for literary symbolism in general. What we mean by literary symbolism here is the use of imaginative material to present a truth other than historical in narrative form. In the Gospels this truth is expected to be theological.

Let us return for a moment to the symbolism of the plastic arts, not because this symbolism is of the same order as literary symbolism, but because it is accepted without question. We will allow Botticelli, Angelico and their associates to paint the Nativity in a way which is almost totally unhistorical. We do not therefore say that the painting is untruthful. The birth of a male infant is in itself, of course, an exciting event; it is a crisis in the lives of the parents and in the life of the infant. The beginning of a new human life is an event of such moment that art and language are helpless in its presence; they are afraid of falling into sentimentalism and missing the deep reality of the event. Yet this exciting event is routine; it happens every day, every hour, every minute. That one can discern the whole wonder of creation in a single birth becomes obscure because of the prodigality with which life is dispensed. How shall the painter represent a scene at once so common and so thrilling?

IF A SINGLE typical birth scene is more than the talent and industry of a great artist can easily represent, surely that unique birth which was the Incarnation is even more difficult; but artists have been less hesitant here. The greatest Nativity scenes, in the opinion of this untrained observer, are those which have caught something of the miracle of birth; and these are few. But the artist was encouraged because the literary sources give him ample material for his artistic symbolism. They give him angels, shepherds, and wise men from the East. It is then up to him to surround his central figures with an unearthly luminosity which suggests that heaven and earth meet here, and to put on their countenances the expression of humble wonder which reveals the presence of majesty recognized. This birth scene is the encounter of man with God, the inbreak of God into history; this the artist knows he must portray, and no symbolism which portrays it is inept or illegitimate. In even the most rigid interpretation of the Gospels there is nothing to suggest that handsome winged young men in white robes hovered over the infant and his mother; but I have never found them offensive to my critical sense, because I know that a celestial reality is extremely hard to paint.

The wonders which accompanied the birth in the narratives of Matthew and Luke have left absolutely no trace in the subsequent narratives of the Gospels. Everything suggests that Jesus in His birth, as in His life and death, shared fully the common portion of man. The wonder of the Incarnation was perceived in the Gospels by faith, and not by sensible apprehension. But the writer, like the painter, needs the realities of the sensible world as symbols of the realities of the spiritual world. Both Matthew and Luke are clear that Jesus is not the natural son of Joseph. Jesus is the Son of God, and they did not think it enough to say this simply. I can hardly quarrel with their effort to say it more emphatically. On the assumption—which, as we have seen, can be easily made—that they had little or no positive information about the events of the birth of Jesus, they had ample reason for filling this historical vacuum with a statement of the fundamental reality of the Incarnation. That they chose a narrative form instead of a philosophical form for the statement is altogether in keeping with their known literary habits; neither Gospel contains a single philosophical statement.

It is evident from the Gospels that Jesus was extremely reserved about the kingship of the Messiah, and this reserve needs no explanation. It is somewhat surprising that most of the allusions to the messianic kingship are found in the infancy narratives. The paradox of kingship in infancy and poverty is evident, and it has furnished material for many sermons. The kingship of Jesus was always a paradox when it was seen in contrast to his human condition. Matthew and Luke are not so much concerned with affirming his kingship as with defining the type of kingship which the Messiah possessed. His kingship was not a rule of pomp and power; it was a kingship proper to him who called himself meek and humble of heart, and told his apostles that they should be the lackeys and slaves in the Church which he founded. No better opportunity to set forth this unique kingship could be found than the period in the life of Jesus when he showed the image of kingship least. The only explicit profession of kingship in the Gospels outside of the infancy narratives is found in the Gospel of John, where Jesus professes kingship when he stands as a prisoner about to be condemned to death.

A theme which runs through the Gospel of Matthew is that Jesus Messiah found faith among the Gentiles which he did not find among his own people. This haunting tragedy of the history of Israel always lies near the surface. It is explicit in Matthew's story of the Magi, unidentified men from a foreign country who come to Israel to seek that which Israel had in its midst without knowing it. The hatred of the Messiah which Herod shows is a prefiguring of the hatred of the Jewish leaders who bring Jesus to his cross. But Jesus is the Messiah of the world and not merely of the Jews; and the Gentiles who seek him will find him—indeed, God

will lead them if they can find no human guidance. Efforts to frustrate the messianic mission cannot succeed; they may produce a bloody slaughter—the Innocents die as Jesus died—but the saving act of God is not arrested by these plots.

A theme constant in Luke is also explicit in his infancy narratives. Luke takes particular delight in presenting Jesus as the Messiah of the poor and the lowly, who is himself poor and lowly. This Messiah shows in the scene of his birth the traits which mark his mission. By a remarkable concatenation of circumstances the Messiah of the poor and lowly has no home in which he can be born. The first to bear witness to his messiahship are the poor and lowly, shepherds whose employment makes them temporarily homeless as he is homeless. The heavenly messengers are not sent to the great and the rich, but to those to whom Jesus will proclaim the Gospel. The Nativity scene of Luke is a narrative commentary on the words in which Jesus thanks the Father that he has hidden his saving plans from the wise and revealed them to the little ones.

These are some of the things on which the interpreter reflects as he reads the biblical narratives and as he is swept into the wealth of symbolism and imagery in the Nativity-Epiphany liturgical cycle. He does not know why others cannot share his reflections; for they differ very little from the traditional Christian reflections in this liturgical cycle. More than others he is sensible of the text just quoted, that the Father has hidden these things from the wise and revealed them to little ones. His wisdom is a demonic quality which at times can frighten him. But ignorance can be demonic too. The interpreter is awed not only by the majestic literary presentation of the Nativity event, but also by the unerring insight with which the Church has always discerned the reality and the significance of the event. With or without discussions of the historical quality of the narrative, the Church has proclaimed the event of the Nativity as the Gospel proclaimed it; it is the advent of the Son of God, the King Messiah of the poor and lowly who demands a faith corresponding to the greatness of God's love revealed in the Incarnation.

A Protestant Viewpoint

Apprehensions About the Council

ROBERT McAFEE BROWN

BY THE TIME this appears in print, Catholics will have read a good deal of non-Catholic criticism of the concluding days of session three of the Council. Many Catholics may be baffled or even hurt at what will seem to them an excessive criticism of the last forty-eight hours. My purpose in what follows is to try to explain the reasons for Protestant apprehensions. I do this not merely as a reporter, but as one who must say, in all candor, that I share the concerns I will try to describe. For the conclusion of session three leaves me much more ecumenically apprehensive than I was at the beginning of session three.

Before indicating the reasons for apprehension, let me make clear that the third session has made many positive contributions, and that I will continue to hope that in the long run they will far outbalance the apprehensions. The overwhelming passage of the statement about the Jews is one such solid achievement. So is the promulgation of the schema on ecumenism, which must be a subject for discussion in this column in the near future.

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The schema on the church has likewise been promulgated, and thus gives evidence that the long-disputed doctrine of collegiality has been formally accepted in principle—though how it is to be implemented still remains deliberately vague and unclear. There have been admirable interventions by the Council Fathers on the themes of poverty, race, and population problems, and there is clear indication that a desire to re-examine such controversial areas as birth control and marriage regulations is not limited to the *avant garde*, since it has received explicit attention by the most highly placed leaders of the Council.

Surely all of this is cause for rejoicing. Much has been accomplished, many formerly closed doors have not only been pushed ajar but actually entered. The Council seems, therefore, well on the way from strength to strength, ready to bring all of this to fruition in the fourth and (as the Pope stressed emphatically in his closing allocution) final session.

And yet . . . And yet there is mounting apprehension, apprehension that can be clarified by examining four events of the closing days of the session. These events lead the Protestant to wonder how many of the words

and even the promulgations are going to be translated into deeds and realities.

1. THE FIRST and most obvious of these events is the failure of the Council to take even a preliminary vote on the religious liberty statement. A year ago the opportunity for a preliminary vote was denied the Council Fathers in a series of events that still wear about them the cloak of mystery, not to say intrigue. It could then have been argued with some plausibility, however, that the Council Fathers needed time to study the text and think through its ramifications. Such time was provided between the sessions. The text was amended in the light of written interventions. It was returned to the Council. It was the subject of stirring, indeed notable, speeches from the Council floor. It was once again reworked by the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity. A move to have it taken from the Secretariat and given to a special commission of four bishops (three of whom had spoken against it) was rebuffed. There was every opportunity given to ventilate attitudes pro and con. The least that could have been expected was a preliminary vote. It could reasonably have been expected that there would be a definitive vote.

But there was no vote at all. Once again, just as a year ago, a tiny handful was able to thwart the overwhelming majority of the Council Fathers. A little over a hundred bishops asked to have the vote postponed. But when, to the surprise of the other Cardinal-presidents, Cardinal Tisserant announced that there had been a decision to postpone the vote, within a few hours fourteen hundred signatures had been secured urging most strongly that a preliminary vote be taken. And yet the Pope turned down the request, acceding to the wishes of one hundred, while denying the wishes of fourteen times that many.

It has already been promised that there will be a vote at the fourth session. But it had already been promised that there would be a vote at the third session. The Council has only one more chance to make good on delayed promises, and it cannot be said too often or too unequivocally that failure of the Council Fathers to adopt the religious liberty statement will be a disaster for the ecumenical movement. This has been said on the Council floor by many bishops and cardinals, and it was clearly stated in their hastily drafted petition to the Pope. But it should be said by non-Catholics as well: as long as the Catholic church appears to claim special privileges for itself in freedom of religious expression, and appears to deny those privileges to other Christian bodies, no atmosphere of trust can develop within which to pursue the ecumenical dialogue.

That the vast majority of the Council Fathers agree with this is manifest. But what is equally manifest is that in two critical tests, that majority has been unable to transform its will into conciliar action. When this

happened a year ago, we were reassured that it would not happen again. It has happened again, and reassurances that it will not happen a third time therefore remain less reassuring than they once were. Indeed, the only good that can come out of this most recent rebuff is a hope that the progressive bishops will feel so frustrated that they will do whatever is necessary to ensure, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that their efforts do not fail for a third and final time. Their wisest move, it would seem, would be to press for assurances that the religious liberty statement will come *early* on the agenda of the fourth session, so that the argument that "there is no time" will be rendered patently invalid. One must hope that, stung by the conservative maneuverings, the progressives will work not just for the adoption of the statement, but for adoption by as overwhelming a majority as possible, in order to negate the feelings of apprehension engendered by the fate of the statement thus far.

2. A SECOND cause for apprehension is focused on the procedures surrounding the adoption of the schema on ecumenism. This was developed over a three-year period by the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, subjected to searching discussion on the floor of the Council and then re-drafted to take into account the concerns of the Council Fathers. When it went to the Pope for his approval, he introduced nineteen modifications, most of them apparently minor, but one of which has important implications for the ecumenical dialogue. The nature of that change is significant, but what is at least as significant is the fact that the Council Fathers had to accept these changes without any chance to discuss or debate them. Their activity as a deliberative assembly went by the boards, and they were given the opportunity to be no more than a rubber-stamp assembly, and to accept, without debate or discussion, changes in the text they had already provisionally approved.

The change that has important ecumenical consequences—and was approved unquestioningly by the bishops—was the deletion of the original statement that the separated brethren *find* God in Jesus Christ through the guidance of the Holy Spirit in Scripture, and the substitution of the statement that the separated brethren *seek* God in Jesus Christ through the guidance of the Holy Spirit in Scripture. The difference between "finding" and "seeking" is a pretty monumental difference, and the new wording can only be interpreted to mean a belief on the part of the Catholic Church that Protestants seek but do not find. This change undercuts a lot of the other gains in the text that were made between sessions, and nullifies a good deal of the appreciation implied elsewhere in the schema for the fact that Protestants do (in however a defective sense from a Catholic point of view) find God pre-eminently through Scripture, read under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

This claim has been the source of whatever authenticity and power we have ever had, and a denial of it jeopardizes many of the gains in ecumenical understanding that have been made in recent years.

3. The treatment of the schema on ecumenism illustrates a third concern Protestants have with the closing of the Council, and this, in the long run, is surely the most serious difficulty. For although the Council promulgated the doctrine of collegiality, asserting that the bishops share rule with the Pope, the actions of the closing hours suggest that there is a vast distance between promulgating a doctrine and actually practicing it. Had the doctrine of collegiality been taken with all seriousness by Pope Paul, one might have expected him, in his closing remarks, to implement it by announcing the establishment of the "senate of bishops" for which so many of the Council Fathers have been hoping, or to have made some other gesture that would have indicated that the church was going to move from word to deed. Instead, he proceeded to devote the bulk of his closing allocution to a treatment of Mary and to the declaration that henceforth she is to be known as *Mater ecclesiae*, Mother of the Church.

WHAT IS particularly disquieting about this unilateral action on the Pope's part is not simply that it was unilateral, but that it did not even reflect a consensus among the bishops which the Pope was merely articulating. Instead, it was an action that went contrary to the sentiments expressed earlier in the Council, where it became quite clear that many of the Council Fathers had serious reservations about applying the title "Mother of the Church" to Mary, either for theological or ecumenical reasons. Yet more, the Pope's action might have been understandable had there been some groundswell from within the life of the worldwide church itself, asking for a clarification of this point, or if there had been some theological crisis calling for a definition by the Holy Father to put tormented theological doubts to rest. But none of these conditions obtained at the end of the Council.


What, then, is one to make of this action? All that seems to have been gained by the non-collegial defining of Mary as the Mother of the Church has been to reassure the conservatives at the Council that things have not changed a bit, and that the doctrine of collegiality need not cause them any worry, since the first thing that was done after proclaiming the doctrine was to act as though the doctrine did not exist.

During the discussions on collegiality at the second session, those of us who were Protestant observers kept asking our *periti* friends, "What would happen if the Pope and the bishops were to disagree about some area of teaching?" We were assured by all that such a question was simply a Protestant way of posing an unreal dilemma, and that since Pope and bishops were simply

two sides of the same coin of ruling authority, it was inconceivable that such a situation would arise. If it developed that there were a significant difference of opinion (the answer continued), the Pope, rather than overriding the convictions of the bishops, would leave the matter open for further thought and maturity, realizing that the time for decision was not yet ripe. It seemed a good answer at the time, always assuming that the Holy Spirit was presiding over the joint actions of Council and Pope. But I am less than satisfied with the adequacy of the answer, in the light of the close of session three. The impression with which I am left is that the bishops can speak and deliberate and propose all they please, but that their corporate wisdom does not count really when it comes to a final formulation of the documents. Even with the doctrine of collegiality, one with a clear majority over twenty-two hundred. It may be that in principle this must always be so. But I am disturbed to have the principle so immediately flouted in practice.

4. The other cause for Protestant concern is not simply the Pope's unilateral action, but the content of his action. Perhaps it is improper for a Protestant to object if the Catholic Church, whether collegially or papally, wishes further to exalt Mary, but it is nevertheless a fact that there is no doctrinal area as ecumenically divisive as Mariology. That the Pope should have chosen to act in a non-collegial manner is the most serious problem, but that he should have chosen so to act in terms of further emphasis on Mary is at least a compounding of the problem, and serves to drive a further wedge between Roman Catholicism and the rest of Christendom at the very point where we had begun to hope that something ecumenically creative could emerge.

For the manifest concern of the majority of the Council Fathers has been to place Mary in a fuller theological perspective (as the decision to incorporate the separate schema on Mary into the schema on the church illustrated), coupled with the further desire to place Marian teaching in as Biblical a framework as possible. All of this has seemed to Protestants an expression of



ecumenical goodwill—not an attempt to retract anything about Mary, but to put teaching about her in the context best calculated to help *all* Christians re-think their understanding of her. That intent, which has been so apparent through more than two years of Conciliar debate, has been virtually nullified by the last fifteen minutes of session three, since the action of the Pope clearly carries more power and more weight than all the deliberations of all the bishops at all the sessions combined.

THOSE ARE THE apprehensions I hear expressed among Protestants, and the apprehensions I feel in my own heart. I state them as directly as I can, so that the issues can be understood as clearly as possible. This does not mean that ecumenism is finished or that deeper relationships can no longer develop between Protestants

and Catholics, but it does mean that a good deal of the creative atmosphere built up by Pope John and the great majority of the bishops is threatened. It does not mean that good can no longer emerge out of the Council, but it does mean that Protestants will be watching with a new kind of anxiety to see whether the tendencies described above predominate at the fourth session, or whether the tendencies manifested by the bishops themselves are reasserted. It does not mean that the doors that have been opened are no longer open, but it does mean that many Protestants will wonder if those doors were ever open as wide as we had been daring to hope. It does not mean that we can no longer work and pray together, but it does mean that we must work more fervently, and pray with more vigor than ever before, *Veni Creator Spiritus*.

Witness in the World

Liturgy and Action

PETER J. RIGA

WE ARE LIVING in exciting times for the Church. We have already launched into an unprecedented intelligent interest and participation in the liturgy. The desire for unity of the Christian community has never been so strong or so well encouraged in what is known as the ecumenical movement. A deeper knowledge and appreciation of the Sacred Scriptures has immensely contributed to our spiritual lives. These movements are renovations *within* the structure of the Church, both in its strict interpretation as the Catholic Church and more broadly, the entire Christian Community.

There is another dimension of the Church which needs rethought in our day. It is the dimension of the Church's relationship to the secular world, of her witness therein. Since Leo XIII (*Rerum Novarum*) up to and including Pope John's two earthshaking documents, *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in Terris*, the Church has developed fully a whole new dimension to her being: the corpus of social thought. In our seminaries, we have treated this corpus as a type of adjunct "added on" to the "regular courses" of dogma, moral, Scripture, etc. This, of course, is not only to lessen its importance, but it fundamentally distorts the incarnational mission of the Church. Dogma and social principles are not two entities which exist along side of each other. On the

contrary, they are two sides of the same coin. Worship of God and service of the brethren are what makes Christianity to be what it is.

Thus liturgy, which is nothing more than dogma prayed, in the phrase of Vatican II, can never be a simple ritual, repeated phrases and readings, but of its very nature must be viewed as it is: that is, as radically orientated towards daily life. There can never be any disjunction of the two. They are two sides of the same coin of worship, of the Christian life lived in Christ. The Christian's life and practice is a test to see if he has really grasped what God has told him in the liturgical assembly. His life is a continuation of the liturgy, a continuous offering, a sort of prolonged and vital liturgy.

We all know very well that worship has within it elements of adoration, gratitude, contrition and petition. But what the Christian community does not seem to understand to any significant degree is that worship is also a school for fraternal service. The ancient Greek word expressed this very well: *Koinonia*, Communion, is both translated as Communion with the Lord in the liturgical assembly but also a service of the brethren which is only the natural outcome of our mutual commitment to and love of Christ and in Him, to each other as true brothers. The great commandments of love of God and of neighbor are indivisible, and worship is the bond which makes them one. The New Testament word

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for love (*agapē*) is used indiscriminately for both God and man. The Church worships in order to prepare men for God, so that in turn, she may also prepare men for the service of man. The dialogue in the liturgical assembly must not, cannot go on apart from neighbor and the notion of service. Such a dichotomized view of Christianity is a monstrosity, a monstrosity which goes on today in spite of the frequentation of the Sacraments. In a sense, this is *the* great tragedy of modern Catholicism: too long have we separated worship from the service of the brothers, from our fellow man without regard to race, color or creed.

THE "GOOD" nineteenth-century Catholic liberals (today: conservatives) practiced their religion well in so far as sacramental frequentation was concerned, but the service of social and economic justice for the brethren wasn't even considered a part of "worship." The same can be said today of our Latin American neighbors. The few rich (all, almost without exception) frequent the sacraments weekly but obstinately refuse any service of the brethren in just gradual taxation, agrarian reform, investment of capital at home instead of Switzerland and Wall Street. Nor must we look across our borders for such a dichotomy. The race problem in the United States is a classical example. How very, very many Catholic racists do we have at our Communion rails each Sunday (and a few possibly in our pulpits). Nor do the aged, the forty-odd million poor of the "other America" seem to cause our consciences much trouble either in the liturgical community or elsewhere.

The situation is very serious. The mute and individual worshipper who does not realize this Christian and human solidarity and therefore responsibility, who busily promotes his private bartering with God, is a contradiction in terms.

The vital unity of doctrine and social justice as the concrete application of doctrine in practical life, cannot be over-emphasized in the training of future priests and laymen. It cannot be relegated to a course or two in first or second theology; it must be spread throughout the whole of education; for our effect on the modern world will radically depend on whether we can meaningfully apply the social teachings of the Church to the world. In this corpus of social thought, the Church speaks the language of modern man, becomes involved in his problems and agonies. If this is not done, we can forget about *aggiornamento* of the Church in the modern world. I cannot over-emphasize the vital importance of stressing the whole *corpus* of the Church's social thought. The students' and the seminarians' minds must be as totally imbued with it as they are with their scholastic theology, because on this will depend whether we shall have anything meaningful to tell the world; or whether we shall continue spouting our irrelevant "natural law theories" to a world which neither understands

us nor is in any way attracted to us by what we have to say.

The liturgy "makes the Christian" (to use the phrase of the ninth-century French ritual), gives his identification both with regard to his celestial calling and his earthly commitment to the city of man. In reality, the worship of God and the service of man are two sides of the same coin of worship. To emphasize one at the cost of the other is to destroy the Christian message of the good news of salvation. One cannot separate liturgical worship from social action for the two together spell the Christian total commitment. If we emphasize one at the cost of the other we have either "Transcendentalism" which has been characteristic of Catholicism of the past 400 years (as well as Eastern Orthodox Christianity). As Péguy once remarked, the reason why many Catholics do not have dirty hands is because they have no hands. The concomitant complement to the liturgy is social action; both together are the fulness of Christian action and commitment.

On the other hand, if we stress social action and justice without the liturgy, we have a type of terrestrial messianism similar to that of Marxism. To tell the truth, this is the great temptation of the economically and technically growing world and most of the blame must be placed on Christians who have been satisfied to go to Mass and the Sacraments without realizing the fraternal love in social action as a natural concomitant to liturgical worship.

THERE CAN be no living nor authentic faith in God without "works of faith"; and among these there is first of all that of caring for others "without distinction of persons": "thou shall love the Lord thy God . . . thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 22:36). To love one's neighbor as oneself is not confined to satisfying, by means of Catholic Charities, the most urgent necessities of our neighbor. It means also and above all effectively to desire for him what we desire for ourselves: civil rights, health, education, development, civilization and culture. It means to wage an effective war for him against the evils which we fight for our own advantage; to do our best to eliminate the great economic and social inequalities and the oppression of man by man. Unless priests get across this social message to their people as part and parcel of the Christian message, then we can simply forget about any meaningful *aggiornamento*.

To be a Christian is not purely to serve God but it is also a dynamic social ethic, a service to mankind; it is not merely a theology but also an anthropology. And although Christianity is directed to the "beyond" it nevertheless must influence our actions in the realm of the "here below" of fostering science and promoting civilization. It must give a deeper meaning to our bond with the world and with his-

tory. Solidarity with the agonies and problems of modern man becomes the sacrament of God's saving presence in the midst of the world: "I was naked and you clothed Me; I was in prison and you came to Me" (Matt. 25:36-40).

The widespread representation of Christianity as the antagonist of the Communist social system, or even of the social organization of society, is very dangerous. It creates the impression that the Christian faith is primarily a negative and conservative force in social matters, that it is the strongest bulwark of the capitalist concept of society and the distribution of wealth. Christianity thereby loses almost all of the creative value of the social revolution that is embedded in her own doctrines.

This is unfortunate, even tragic, since the social teachings of the Church can revolutionize the world, can make the Church meaningful to modern man and his problems. She can vitally contribute to the reorganization of today's world. Yet this force can be effectively applied only when Christianity pays heed to the true causes of the social disease and fights the evil in its roots.

We see only what we want to see and not, as should be, the total vision of faith of what the Church really is. She is always holy in Her origin, Her doctrine, Her saints, throughout the course of human history; but she is also, here on earth, the *ecclesia semper reformanda*, the Church of sinners, of those who continuously need that conversion (the New Testament *Metanoia*) of heart. To emphasize one at the cost of the other is to commit the greatest sin of the Christian economy: to deny Her incarnationism, Her divine-humane existence among sinful and miserable men. The Church is in the same economy of salvation of the Word incarnate, Who took upon Himself absolutely everything that we sinful men are and have, except sin. Here was scandal enough, for, in the final analysis, the criteria of both Christ and His Church are not, cannot be the criteria of a human person or a human organization. In this, they occupy the same sphere of human scandal: "The Jews demand miracles and the Greeks look for wisdom, but we, for our part,

preach a crucified Christ . . . Who is the power of God and the wisdom of God" (I Cor 1:23, 25).

Thus our confusion when we come to measure Christ and His Church in human categories. St. John depicts Christ's *triumph* when He is crucified on the Cross (the Greek word which St. John uses when speaking of the crucifixion is *glorification*). The Christian's real triumph is when he is dissolved and one with Christ (Philip 1:23). He is most like Christ when he suffers (Gal: 2:20-21); here below, there is such a bond of union between Christ and the poor and despised of this earth (Matt. 25:35), that they are his choicest friends and companions—because they are the most despised (Matt. 9:11).

THIS IS the logic of the Gospel. Have we, Catholics as a group, really taken seriously this logic of the Gospels? Oh yes, we have always had our examples of heroic poverty in our midst: The many religious orders and others who have taken the vow. But it is strange that when the Gospels speak of the poor, the despised and the neglected, the message is for all the followers of Christ. We have simply not taken the Gospel seriously on this point and yet it is clear for all to read. We have followed the scholastic moralists in distinguishing "heroic" poverty from the "ordinary" demands of ordinary Christians. The religious would practice the former and the rest of the faithful could ride along on the Christian life with considerably less. In practice, this has come to mean that poverty is something foreign to the layman and the diocesan priest. The idea would be comforting if it did not contradict the Gospel. Every Christian by his very profession must practice poverty and what he has must be used in such a way as to best aid his brothers.

Only in this context can riches make any sense for the Christian. But we have gone merrily on our way with a type of bourgeois Christianity which is very characteristic of American Catholics. "The good life" is part and parcel of American (and *ipso facto*, I take it) Catholic thinking. We have managed to "baptize" this as much as possible; we have "opiumized" our consciousness by various "charity" appeals, support of schools and institutions with the result that the Catholic consciousness in the U.S. can rest fairly easy ("we are a generous Church") in the midst of forty million people of poverty, of the other America, and where over half of the world's people go to bed hungry every night. How did we get to this point? Our pulpits have helped "opiumize" their congregations by making them believe that if they "support" their Church and various other charity appeals, they are good Catholics. The poverty of the Gospels is not even discussed from these pulpits for fear of a "fanaticism" by those who would take the Gospel too seriously.



And what of our association with the poor and despised in accordance with the Gospel's logic? Is it in conformity with these social teachings of the Church? Here indeed speaks the wisdom of the world in Catholicism's midst. We cannot discuss here the utter failure of so-called conservative-type Catholics to respond in any meaningful way to this essential phase of Gospel teaching. It is enough to mention the failure of Catholics in great number to meet the challenge of the race problem in the United States. We are beginning to wake up but only after the Negro himself has forced us to take stock of our own Christian teachings and its connotations for race. To be close to the poor? Catholicism's answer to sane urban renewal was and is a massive exodus to the suburbs and the "good life" while leaving those stinking and squalid poor in their own blighted neighborhoods. Get out as soon as you can especially if a Negro moves into the neighborhood. Panic and run, don't stay to suffer and work and be identified with the poorest of humanity.

Another point is that of the international community. While Pius XII spoke frequently and favorably about the United Nations and its objectives, Pope John in *Peace on Earth* made explicit reference to the United Nations as a positive embodiment of his ideal of the international authority of the international community. American Catholics seem to manifest a massive reluctance to endorse any form of internationalism which requires the smallest surrender of American sovereignty. The American Catholic community was never in full sympathy with this side of Pope Pius' and Pope John's thought, and it has even failed in general to become acquainted with it. Pope John's *Pacem in Terris* will serve as a clear and authoritative rebuke to the numerous Catholics who have not relinquished this false notion of exaggerated nationalism and who have thus failed to appreciate the mind of the Holy See on this highly important issue.

LET ME SAY immediately that I do not blame these Catholics. They have simply been the recipients of a notion of religion which was restricted to sacramentalism and ritual without a dynamic orientation of liturgy and doctrine to applied Christianity, social Christianity.

But the liturgy, the announcing in word and act of the good news (gospel) and communication of Christ's saving Pascal mystery would be an eviscerated liturgy without authentic fruit if it does not aim at a spiritual offering and a lived Gospel, to and for charity among all men, the conversion of the world, and the consecration of the whole world and its activities to Christ.

Laymen, members of God's people of full right, who have participated in the sacred mystery and who have

centered their lives with Christ, dead and resurrected, at Mass, are the same members who must put the Holy Sacrifice at the center of their lives in the World, among men. They are Christ's true envoys, His ambassadors; they are the spiritual prolongation of Christ's saving liturgical mystery in the midst of their brothers in the world. In virtue of this saving liturgical mystery, they must render this earth more inhabitable, more humane, more just.

All of the modern revolutions, from a social point of view, have been conceived outside of the Church and sometimes in opposition to her. Democracy, religious liberty, the social, the psychological, the scientific revolution, woman's suffrage and finally the slave problem and civil rights. The charge is grave but can be amply substantiated. The problem for the modern Catholic is to enter into each of these fields and reap what is good and fine in them and bring the light of charity and faith to bear on them. The first stage of the rocket to fire modern Catholicism out of a Constantinian chauvinism came with the modern popes, from Leo XIII up until John XXIII. A new age, the Johannine era, is upon us for the future and it promises such magnificent spiritual fruits that one dare not at this moment try to enumerate them.

Pope John fully recognized this problem in his magnificent and revolutionary encyclical, *Peace on Earth*. Both this encyclical and *Mater et Magistra* must be read to see all the social connotations which flow from the direct profession of the Christian faith. For the social teaching of the Church is not a sort of afterthought of the body of Christian doctrine; on the contrary, it is the living, vital and dynamic embodiment of Christian teaching to the basic and human problems here below. General teachings are of little value unless they are brought to bear on the dirty and agonizing problems of real men in a real world in the course of human history. When the Church attempts to do this, She immediately becomes relevant to man's problems and *ipso facto* repugnant to many of our Catholics who have conceived of the Church and religion as a type of ivory tower, "sweet Jesus and me" aspect of the divine life.

The natural reaction to the Church when she attempts to make Christ's teaching relevant and meaningful to modern man through her social teaching is one of disbelief and dismay. What has the Sermon on the Mount to do with civil rights, urban renewal, nuclear disarmament, the U.N., the economic society, immigration, internal law, peace movements, racism, nationalism and internationalism? The answer is simple: Everything, for the Church's teachings on these aspects is her vital life-line for the salvation of men of *this* world, at *this* time. To misunderstand the social teaching of the Church is to misunderstand the very nature of Christianity.

Boy with a Hare

In fall light
and the highway,
a child
holding up in his hands
not lanterns
or petals
but the death of a hare.

Motor cars rake
the cold causeways.
Faces are glazed
under
windshields,
eyeballs
of metal
and inimical
ears,
teeth hurrying,
crackling their
lightning,
sheering away to the sea
and the cities;
and a child
with a hare
in the autumn,
shy
as a
thistle-seed,
rigid
as flint,
lifting
his hand
to the
fume
of the motorcade.

(Nobody
slackens.)

It is tawny
up on the ridges,
on the summit,
the hues
of a puma, pursued.
The silence
goes
violet.
Like
cinders, black diamonds,
the eyes
of the child and the hare.
two
knife-points
upright
on a knifeblade,
two little black poniards,
the eyes

of a little child
lost,
who
proffers
the death of a hare
in the towering
Fall
of the road.

PABLO NERUDA
(Translated by
Ben Belitt)

The Moment Before Silence

Ecstasy
does not begin
before the final word
is spoken:
Fiat,
let it be done.

Dawn
is Isaian coal
cleansing the eyes of heart
to meet
the Sun.
SISTER M. SIMPLICIA, I.H.M.

January Night

The highways close: ice lacquers ice;
And now a drying, sifting snow
Finds where the last of the roads
show,
And everyone who walked is wise.

But not as wise as those inside:
The watchers at the windows hoard
The charm that facts outside afford:
The stark of black white skies is pied

Beauty, and windows make its stars;
No man goes by in his own hide—
The erlking passes in dim stride.
Yet children huddled in stalled cars

See him, and glory in their fear,
And fathers gritting down the storm
To find a farmhouse will grow warm
And bend and stumble into cheer

And see the blazing window and sing
The coming that has mocked the
bright
Security. Bitter delight
Sifts, drifts, and covers everything.
ROBERT BEUM

On the Death of a Hermit Saint

In the end, loud above the drumbeat of carrion birds pounding
black wings on a skin-tight sky, did you
hear it? Did it boom again out of the stillness, flash
in semaphore from the sands bright as aluminum shook in a gale:
Follow Me, follow Me, yourself alone?

In the end were there dead left unburied as there were in
the beginning; and what of the everlasting lack of script
the dearth of shoes, and staffs to lean on, and shadowy pools
when the sun whipped round like the wind? Was silence from ambush
forever thundering stormily?

Was there a felt lack of multitudes applauding; and what of the
non-existence of a single hand laid lightly on the destruction
of your sloping shoulders: Was it hard, old man, dying alive?
In the end were you alone more than the hurt of a face, aging,
scraping a pillow of stone.

Old man dying, then at the hour of death, were there angels ascending
and descending and a cup running over: Did lions, harts and
leaping does pace you from the wilderness? Oh you who have
withstood the sands and solitudes, yourself alone, pray for us,
having now fiercely outsilenced our song,
having now handily outwalked our running.

GIOVANNA DRISCOLL

DECEMBER 25, 1964 449

One World, One Law?

MARK R. MacGUIGAN

THOUGH world politics and world law may sometimes seem to be at odds, almost all the great issues of world affairs raise questions of international law. They must be dealt with in a legal as well as in a political context. Thus in the last decade the political crises over the U-2 flights in May of 1960, over missiles in Cuba in October of 1962, and over the Gulf of Tonkin incident last August have also been crises of international law. No less have the contributions of the United Nations to world peace through the sending of peace forces to the Suez Zone in 1956, to the Congo in 1960, and to Cyprus in 1964 been contributions to law in the making.

The détente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., resulting from the Cuba Crisis, provided a fertile ground for the development of international legal rules and institutions, and most of the events of this year prior to October promised a favorable climate for germination. The apparent preoccupation of Khrushchev with internal Communist problems, particularly the Sino-Soviet dispute, the mild Soviet reaction to the dangerous Tonkin incident, and the moderate positions (in the opinion of many observers, more moderate than those of the West) taken by Russian delegates to the biennial conference of the International Law Association in Tokyo in August and to that of the United Nations' Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Peaceful Cooperation Among States in Mexico City in September all argued the continuance of the détente.

However, early in October the United States served notice, in a memorandum submitted to the Secretary-General U Thant, that it would insist on the strict application of Article 19 of the Charter, which would deprive the U.S.S.R. of its vote in the United Nations General Assembly for its being two years in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions. The Soviet Union owes the U.N. \$52,600,000 as a result of its refusal to pay assessments for the Middle East and Congo peace forces. It bases its refusal on the legal argument that the Security Council has the exclusive right to initiate peace-keeping forces, and that members have therefore no responsibility for the financing of General Assembly-initiated forces. The Soviet interpretation of the U.N. Charter has been rejected by the International Court of

Justice, but as the I.C.J. had been asked merely for an advisory opinion and as the Court split along political lines, the result was not accepted by all the parties concerned. In deciding to force the issue, the United States appeared to be banking on the hope that the U.S.S.R. will pay rather than lose its General Assembly vote or withdraw completely from the U.N.

Now the explosion of the first Chinese nuclear device, along with the more sympathetic attitude of the new Soviet Government towards Peiping, will undoubtedly lead to new efforts in the United Nations to admit Red China to that body. Indeed there has been speculation that the Canadian Government may take the initiative in having China seated at the U.N. It has never made much sense to exclude the world's most populous state from the United Nations when 112 nations of all sizes and all political stripes have been admitted. It makes even less now, when Red China has become one of the world's five nuclear powers, and has itself begun to speak of nuclear disarmament. The legal arguments against the admission of the Peoples' Republic of China to the U.N., like those against diplomatic recognition, are slender indeed.

The uneasy association of world politics and world law has led to attempts to establish the primacy of one or the other. Naturally enough, Western lawyers have tended to favor world law, and in 1959 the American Bar Association launched a project to encourage the use of law in the settlement of international disputes. More recently, a non-profit institution, the Institute for International Order, has established a six-year education project known as "The Fund for Education Concerning World Peace through World Law." By the time this project is completed in 1967, it is expected that a great deal of material will have been published, and that many study programs will have been held in secondary, post-secondary, and adult education.

NO ONE in the Western world could be opposed in theory to either world law or world peace, and so everyone is bound to agree that a focussing of public attention in this way on the problems of world order is a salutary event. But although both of these concepts are as unimpeachable as motherhood, utopian concentration on them can also be as barren of living issue as verbal exaltations of motherhood. It is all too easy to see in

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world law, and particularly in gigantic theoretical constructs of legal scaffolding, the solution to all problems vexing the world community. Such a vision of a peaceful universe achieved through law can be a dangerously deceptive dream. It is true only to the extent that it recognizes law as an indispensable instrument of social order. It is quite untrue when it gives rise to the belief that the primary *approach* to world problems should be through law, particularly when this involves a commitment to an ideal code of law for the world as a practicable political pursuit.

For in truth law is not an independent reality, but a secondary, dependent one. It is a mere means to social ends, and it can be neither comprehended nor sustained apart from its social context. And of all social ends it is the political to which law is the most directly subject.

Of course, for those who accept it, the doctrine of natural law gives a certain permanence and universality to law. But even a complete acceptance of natural law theory would not lessen the teleological orientation of positive law, though it would fasten it to enduring goals rather than to the political ends of the moment. Moreover, natural law is inevitably so general and imprecise that it sounds a most uncertain trumpet for the political battle; to change metaphors, it can give direction, but not directions.

This characterization of law as the handmaiden of politics is true of international law no less than of national law. Indeed, the subordination is more obvious in international affairs. In national law, the establishment or nullification of a legal rule by majority power is often an affair of decades, or even centuries. In the international realm, naked confrontations of rule and power are by no means infrequent. One does not have to look to the East for examples of the subordination of law to national interest. Not long ago the foreign minister of a Western power admitted in a candid moment that international law was not a prime consideration in the formulation of his country's foreign policy. The United States has never made such a public admission, but two instances will make it clear that in fact the American attitude towards world affairs is primarily one of self-interest. One instance is the tacking on to the American acceptance of the jurisdiction of the World Court in The Hague the so-called Connally Amendment, which reserves to the United States the determination of whether the matter in dispute is within the jurisdiction of the Court or within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. Obviously a court cannot function effectively when its very jurisdiction is subject to the veto of one of the litigating parties. Such a limitation can have only a political inspiration.

The other instance is the attitude of the American Government and public towards the high-altitude U-2 flights over Cuba: that not only are such flights for reconnaissance purposes justifiable, but that the shoot-

ing down of the planes by Cuban anti-aircraft missiles will lead to U.S. retaliation against the anti-aircraft bases. The American justification for the flights, which are admitted to be a technical violation of Cuban sovereignty, is that the Castro Government never agreed to allow inspection of possible offensive missile bases and that the reconnaissance is therefore necessary to guard against any attempt to install offensive weapons. This may indeed be a valid argument, but it is an argument which must find its justification in international power politics rather than in international law.

The subjection of international law to national power is in fact written into the very fabric of that law, for it acknowledges that all residual power rests with national states. This was established in the famous *Lotus Case*, decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927. There, following a collision on the high seas between a Turkish vessel and a French one, Turkish authorities obtained custody of the officer of the watch on the French ship when his ship put in at Constantinople. Despite the fact that he was a French citizen, a Turkish court sentenced him to imprisonment and fine. The Turkish action was upheld by the World Court on the ground that a state retains every power which is not expressly negated by international law, and that no established rule prevented Turkey from exercising criminal jurisdiction in such a case. This precedent was available to Israel in the *Eichmann Case*, where Israel's only positive claim to jurisdiction was her custody of the defendant.

ANOTHER great deficiency of international law is the absence of machinery for the enforcement of judgments, whether of courts or of arbitral tribunals. With the disappearance of the Austinian doctrine that sanction is the essence of law, the theoretical problem of whether international law can truly be faded in importance, but the problem remains an acute one in the practical order. It is true that there has been only a single case of disobedience to a decision of a World Court (in the *Corfu Channel Case*, decided in 1948, Great Britain was awarded \$2,500,000 by the Court, but was unable to recover that sum from Albania). It is true also that there has been non-compliance with the decisions of only a handful of the thousands of cases considered by arbitral and other judicial tribunals over the centuries. But in one case final settlement was effected only by an agreement between the parties. A number of other cases have not been contests between parties, but merely advisory opinions given on references to the Court of difficult questions—and as already pointed out, these may not be taken seriously by affected parties.

Arbitration results have been good between law-minded countries like the United States and Great Britain, but in general one must conclude that the excellent record of international adjudication results

largely from the fact that major issues between major countries have never been submitted for judicial settlement. The only agency capable of enforcing judgments is the United Nations. Up to now the U.N. has been able to form police forces only on an *ad hoc* basis, and as events in both the Congo and in Cyprus have proved, there are pressures which make it almost impossible for U.N. forces to be given authority to suppress disorder by military means, even when the contending parties are weak.

BUT PERHAPS the chief factor militating against the supremacy of world law is neither the gaps in its rules nor its absence of sanctions, but rather the failure of all the nations to agree on which international law to apply. We in the West have tended to regard traditional international law as universal, but Communist states regard it rather as an instrument designed to serve the interests of capitalist-imperialist powers. Many of the newly emancipated states, though not Marxist-inspired, react in the same way. While we may deny the motives imputed to us, on reflection we can hardly deny that traditional international law is Western in inspiration, in conception, and in development, and that it is only the political weakness of the rest of the world that has concealed that fact until now. Indeed, in certain areas of international law it has always been obvious that any consensus was a very limited one—for example, in the areas of nationalization and territorial waters—but it has perhaps not been clear until the last decade just how regional traditional international law is.


Here, then, is the ultimate subordination of law to politics: just as there are at least three political worlds, so there are at least three corresponding international laws—traditional or Western, Communist, and neo-nationalist. Actually the neo-nationalist states of Africa and Asia are not so interested in creating a completely new system of international law as in having the right to select from the traditional rules those which suit their interests. The Communist world, however, and principally the Soviet Union, has displayed its intention to construct a complete system of international law, based on the concept of peaceful co-existence.

The five principles of co-existence are derived from the treaty between India and the People's Republic of China on April 29, 1954. They are: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual advantage; and peaceful co-existence itself. The generality of these principles is such that their implications are by no means clearly understood, and Soviet internationalists have not been very helpful in spelling them out. Yet it must be said that they have a number of times attempted to have the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, devote its attention to a study of them, only to have their initiative rejected by West-

ern delegates suspicious of a background political motivation.

WHAT DOES seem to be clear is that traditional international law is not so much rejected as expropriated, with Soviet theorists putting selected portions of it to use. For example, there is a strong emphasis on the doctrine of national sovereignty and on treaties rather than custom as the primary source of international law. On the one hand, then, supra-nationalism is discarded as an unacceptable limitation of sovereignty and the United Nations and the International Court of Justice are de-emphasized. On the other hand, a treaty-like approach is taken to customary international law. The result is that the validity of a customary rule is restricted to those states which explicitly recognize it as binding, and international law is regarded as bi-polarized on the basis of two diametrically different economic systems. One cannot go much further, from the Soviet materials themselves, in analyzing co-existence. But a leading Sovietologist, Professor Edward McWhinney, has recently made a stimulating study of the Soviet understanding of co-existence on the basis of their conduct of international relations, using the Cuban crisis as a case study, from which he concludes that the Soviets approach international law primarily in terms of a balance of power principle.

The Soviet and neo-nationalist attitude towards traditional international law cannot be ignored if we in the West do not want to find ourselves repeating ancient formulas as a mere ritual. Consequently, the path to peace will not be the high road of patient piecemeal plodding through a wilderness of single instances. The Soviet distrust of the United Nations, based on the feeling that it does not represent the realities of world power, means that an idealistic revision of the U.N. Charter, in the direction of greater reliance on law, such



as that proposed by Clark and Sohn in their book *World Peace Through Law*, is not only completely utopian, but approaches the problem from the wrong road. The problem is basically a political one, and must therefore be approached as a practical issue, not as a speculative theorem.

An obvious example of the proper approach is the test-ban treaty of August 7, 1963, which forbids nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under the water. So popular has this treaty proved that it has now been adhered to by a grand total of 107 states, including all the Great Powers except France and Red China. Another example is the challenging proposal made this year by Canada's Prime Minister Pearson for a new kind of international police force. Recognizing the impossibility of a permanent United National police force because of Communist opposition, Mr. Pearson suggested that a number of middle powers should work out an arrangement among themselves by which they would establish an international police force composed of their own nationals, but trained, equipped, and operated collectively. They would then offer their services to the United Nations, and would be available as a stand-by peace force, ready for any emergency. Such a plan would bypass but not transgress the United Nations Charter, and reveals the kind of initiative needed for an attack on international problems. A first step towards the implementation of the Pearson Plan will be the holding of an international conference in Ottawa in early November.

It is unrealistic to expect to solve international problems by judicial authority for a long time to come. Indeed, an analysis of the kinds of disputes that are justiciable would exclude those where the parties are concerned, not with obtaining their legal rights, but with satisfying their interests. Nor is it realistic to pin our faith on the authority of a super-legislature, a parliament of man. Agreement, rather than authority, must be the primary means for establishing justice in a world of antagonistic societies. Law will be the consequence of agreement; it will even be the form of agreement; but the agreement will come first, the law second.

World peace through law? The more realistic hope is for world law through peace.

AN APPEAL: An Indian priest seeks help in organizing a cooperative for cycle rikshawmen in Quilon. He aims to enable each poor worker to become owner of his rikshaw in two years. He is also establishing cottage industries for women who cannot work outside their homes. These people need help in order to become self-supporting. Donations should be sent to Rev. Fr. Jacob, O.F.M.Cap., St. Anthony's Friary, Quilon, South India. (Airmail: 25¢).

THE SCREEN

Gem of Purest Ray Serene

IT IS a pleasure to be able to report the arrival of several new films for Christmas that are worthy of your attention. And it is a particular pleasure to comment on "World Without Sun," which is certainly one of the most beautiful movies ever made. Directed by Jacques-Yves Cousteau who led an expedition in 1963 in the depths of the Red Sea, the film displays not only the underwater splendors but also Cousteau's Oceanauts in action. Their purpose, besides to explore and collect specimens, was to set up a small colony of buildings to learn if men could live and work in watery depths for a whole month.

The expedition was a success—and so is the movie about it, which succeeds, as few documentaries of this kind do, in establishing the various members of its team as interesting lively personalities. No doubt the men themselves, the scientists, divers, and technicians, are engaging fellows; and the camera catches them at work and play as they swim through the sea, or relax, sleep, eat, and housekeep in the large underwater cabin, or patiently sweat it out as two of the Oceanauts do for a week in a small cabin 80 feet deep, or travel around as they often do in that camera-equipped, two-man Diving Saucer that glides through the water with amazing grace.

Poetic grace and beauty permeate much of "World Without Sun" thanks to Pierre Goupil's stunning color photography of what's in the sea—the multi-colored fish, the plankton (shown in magnificent and sometimes frightening magnified shots) and other odd fauna and flora (some of which are still in a stage where they can't decide which they are). Aided by James Dugan's excellent running commentary, and the underwater gurgles and delightful music on the sound track, the visuals frequently have a haunting aura of scary mystery, a frightening quality that is felt most of all when the sound track is completely silent and the Diving Saucer slides into unexplored caverns where startled weird creatures stare back in animosity (or what is probably fright on their part).

The film does not discuss the scientific importance of Commander Cousteau's findings, but it is known that he stresses underwater cultivation as a source of food supply and perhaps the answer to the whole hunger problem. "World Without Sun" does show man's efforts to learn to live in the sea. And it does show some of the grandeur that can be enjoyed deep down after the unknown becomes known and unfearful. It proves Gray's observation some 200 years after the "Elegy": "Full many a gem of purest ray serene, The dark unfathom'd caves of ocean bear." And it also substantiates Emerson's answer: "if eyes were made for seeing/Then Beauty is

its own excuse for being." But you have no excuse if you miss seeing this first-rate film.

AND WHILE you're traveling, you'll have a good time at the latest Disney opus, "Emil and the Detectives." Since Erich Kastner's famous novel (about the country boy, robbed on the way to Berlin and helped by boy detectives who chase the crooks) has been filmed five times before this, you may be familiar with its delightful story. But it is a tale that bears repeating and it is told in this new version with a great deal of winning charm and humor. It also has some of the original story's sophisticated wit; this may elude kids who see it and enjoy all its excitement and suspense, but it will be appreciated by their elders who take them to the movie.

Among the adults in the cast nicely directed by Peter Tewksbury are Walter Slezak as the chief of the crooks who is as interested in food as he is in money but is properly villainous too; and two fine German actors, Heinz Schubert and Peter Ehrlich, as his henchmen. Even against such experienced performers, the eight youngsters in the cast come through with aplomb, especially handsome Bryan Russell as ten-year-old Emil and Roger Mobley who gives an amazingly vivid portrait of the self-sufficient, wise-for-his-years lad who heads the band of boy detectives, all of whom think they are behaving like adults and at times are even brighter than their seniors. Walt Disney's production of "Emil" has been up-dated to post-war West Berlin from Kastner's 1929 book; and the Technicolor photography of the city's modern architecture, old buildings, and bombed-out structures is a thing of extraordinary beauty. The backgrounds almost steal the show—but not quite: you couldn't get away with stealing anything from these young fry supervised by that super sleuth Roger Mobley.

IN YOUR travels, you may want to visit Paris too. If you do, you're on your own. Although "The Umbrellas of Cherbourg" got enthusiastic reviews abroad and is tremendously popular there, I am lukewarm about it. Skillfully directed by Jacques Demy (whose recent "Bay of Angels" I couldn't warm up to either), "Umbrellas" tells a sweet-sad tale of young lovers who are separated when the boy is called to military service, and the girl, already pregnant, is guided by her mother into marriage with a more stable young man, a diamond merchant no less. If you think this sounds like a soap opera, you're right: it is a soap opera with emphasis on opera. All the dialogue in "The Umbrellas of Cherbourg" is sung!

The film has a handsome production with lovely color photography and a pleasant cast of bright-faced, eager young people, but after the first-half-hour, I found the singing rather tiresome. Michel Legrand's score, although good, becomes monotonous, and, carried on for a full-length movie, gets to be a nuisance and detracts from the touching story. Opera enthusiasts may like it

(the picture does have a fresh charm) but even they may prefer their opera grand—and soapless.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

THE STAGE

The Theater of the Undiscussable

THIS SEEMS to be as good a time as any to down hatchet and shovel, and to unleash a few pomposities concerning the current season and the State of the Drama.

A season is, of course, a fairly arbitrary measure to begin with, suggesting as it does a group-consciousness and a grand design that don't really exist outside of the critic's mind. If someone decides to revive Moliere, Moliere becomes at once part of the season, part of 1964. European plays from the thirties get translated at last and become part of the season, too. And even our own playwrights belong intellectually and emotionally to different generations. "Beekman Place," for instance, *looked* like a faded photo from a Burns Mantle roundup—the best plays of 1919, say; "Golden Boy" oscillates schizophrenically between the thirties and the sixties, finding no home in either; while "Luv" is resolutely post-post-Freudian, a double negative that puts us just about back where we started.

Out of these rags, ribbons and bones it is the critic's pleasure to construct something called a season, complete with trends and patterns, and then to discuss his own construction as if it actually lived and breathed and had the power to plot his discomfort; as if, to throw another metaphor on the fire, this many-legged stage-animal was really going somewhere.

So be it. The only trend I have been able to spot so far is toward the more or less undiscussable play. Two plays out of three these days leave one with virtually nothing to write about. Not that they are unpleasant: there simply seems no special reason to *say* anything about them. One begins to feel a little foolish trying to analyze them at all, because they don't seem to be meant for that.

One becomes steadily more amazed by the number of things the daily critics can find to say about routine musicals and one-idea comedies. Do these reviewers take notes? Do they try to *think*? For myself, after stamping and whistling with the rest of the gang (there is some of the buyer-from-out-of-town in all of us), I find that precious little remains. And it seems pointless, almost indecent, to forage among one's very mild memories for an Opinion.

For a reformed movie-reviewer, this situation is by no means unfamiliar. The serious movie-reviewer must either abstain four times out of five, or play the heavy

again and again, thrusting himself between films and their worshipful public, to analyze things that were never meant to be analyzed and to demand explanations when people just want to be left in peace with Doris Day. The theater critic is just beginning to find himself in the same fix.

MOVIE criticism has long since accommodated itself to the undiscussable movie. The daily reviewers, with rare exceptions, register low-brow opinion with accuracy and resignation, while the high-brows save their fire for worthier targets. (Incidentally, the movie reviewer in the middle, i.e. the hardworking middlebrow, finds himself with at least one advantage over his theatrical equivalent—that whereas almost no movie is so bad that you can't get some amusement out of it, a bad play is a peculiarly total kind of disaster.)

Theater criticism has not made a similar adjustment to the undiscussable play—perhaps because of a sincere reluctance to recognize its existence (instead we go on talking year after year of “bad seasons,” as though they were exceptions, as though, from a certain point of view, they were not inevitable). Hence the daily critic finds himself in an impossible squeeze, as he strives to discuss the undiscussable. He is expected, unlike his movie colleague, to service high-brow and low-brow at once; to emote like Wanda Hale of the *Daily News* and to brood like Eric Bentley—and all within a couple of hours of the final curtain.

The daily reviewers are always heckled in the same terms, whoever they happen to be at the moment. (It is curious how often the liberal intelligence forgets that when a whole category of people are invariably in the wrong, there is likely to be something impossibly wrong with the situation). They are accused of being kitsch: but unkitsch criticism would be at cross-purposes with most of the plays they watch. The critic would have to apply standards which the play wasn't trying to reach (movie-reviewers are worn to a nub by this particular problem).

On the other hand, drama critics are not hired to be outright hacks or shills as yet. The theater retains an aura of seriousness such that even when a play carries no more weight than a Doris Day movie, the critic is expected to treat it as if it did. The people who will finally see it are the benefit audiences and the girls from Scarsdale, people who just want to know whether a review is favorable or not (Taubman liked it; I couldn't make out whether Kerr liked it or not) but the reviews are not precisely written for them either. Theater reviewing has not degenerated into an information service like movie-reviewing; at the moment you could call it a serious form applied to an increasingly non-serious subject.

Thus the play-critic becomes an evermore anomalous figure. He may, as I do, genuinely enjoy some undiscussable plays (undiscussable movies can be even bet-

ter, of course) but to be asked to write hundreds of solemn words about them for people who just want a yes or no answer is about as unreasonable as being asked to write seriously about the next Liston-Clay fight. Moreover, there is something undignified in the sight of a grown critic getting down on his knees to examine some trifle when three stars and a wow would do just as well.

It all boils down to a cultural time lag. According to reputable sources, producers and backers shy away from non-musical, non-comical scripts like poison; the stuff that they are looking for is the kind of stuff that defies criticism (how can you criticize the female knee, for instance?) and criticism can only be a nuisance to it. Already, shows like “Golden Boy” are running for months in New York before opening, i.e. before letting the critics in.

This instinct is perfectly sound, because this kind of show has no connection with drama criticism and no need for it. All that is required is for Amanda Smethwick to come and murmur “lovely, just lovely!”; and pretty soon, if it doesn't watch out, it will get Amanda Smethwick too. Amanda may not know much about the theater, but she knows what she likes (just about everything, actually), and is quiveringly sensitive to space requirements.

The space Amanda saves can be used for ads, quoting her “lovely, just lovely” in diminishing echoes.

WILFRID SHEED

CORRESPONDENCE

“Liberals and the Right”

New York City

TO THE EDITORS: At the risk of pulling a tired horse, let me comment on your editorial “Liberals and the Right” [Dec. 11] You state that “the radical right we still have with us,” yet seem to feel that the left has vanished. Or am I treading on too soft a platform of discussion at this time (our era of “liberalism,” 1964)?

You implicitly conclude that because one voted for Goldwater, one must be of the radical right. Please, please, gentlemen! The use of logic is elementary—its misuse is dangerous. Do you mean to say that one could not have reasonably voted for Goldwater without denying Negro rights (or at least equality)? Do you imply that the full force of the Republicans' appeal was based solely on radical rightism at its worst?

It is possible that after experiencing corruption and blatant inefficiency year after year in the Democratic-run city of New York (the micro-level), after asking the Administration time and again for a long-term practical (need I say “logical”) approach to the problem of Vietnam, after seeing our “victory” in Cuba go down to defeat when we did not “follow up” our beliefs,

DECEMBER 25, 1964 455

commitments or pronouncements concerning the situation, and after experiencing, with the death of John Kennedy, a real loss to the country (and ultimately to the Democratic "image" of progressiveness), it is possible, I repeat, that one need not have been "radical" nor "rightist" to have voted for what many considered the "lesser of two evils" (we need not count the many times *this* choice has been offered the public)?

You feel that the beliefs of many citizens stem directly from "the old mythology." Perhaps it is not as mythological as you may think. Perhaps there exist some *truths* and *principles* which grew with the growth of our country.

Man needs, in some degree, myth and symbolism. But, if you were to look at man's history, you would find that these arose out of the people's beliefs over periods of time. Do not ask Democrats to "construct new myths and symbols for a modern America." This would be the supreme trickery and the highest injustice to our generation. And it would probably be too difficult for them, anyway. You say "American liberals must present a larger vision by which the citizen can orient himself . . ." Let me take you one step forward. Do you not mean "American politicians must present [it] . . ." or are you too "leftist" (in this respect) to say so?

FRANK D. TINARI

Scholarship and Parenthood

Philadelphia, Pa.

TO THE EDITORS: In the exchange on Catholic intellectual life many weeks ago Father Greeley rejoiced over the future of Catholic scholarship because of the quantity and quality Catholics now in graduate school. Doctor Donovan after his study of the faculty in Catholic colleges was less enthusiastic. The discussion neglected a fact of Catholic academic life which may appreciably dim Father Greeley's bright future.

Most of us on Catholic campuses are aware of one or more highly capable men whose doctorate was lost somewhere in the procreation and rearing of seven, eight or more children. Two of my friends who had been expecting to complete their doctorates this year are now expecting their seventh child. Both will get the doctorate eventually. Another promising young professor has achieved the birth of four children in less than four years of marriage. Still another man is working toward a doctorate on a graduate assistantship with five young children in his family. A paper given at a recent meeting of the Population Association of America showed that at a state university the fertility of Catholic faculty members far exceeded that of their colleagues.

A rapidly growing family is a direct drain on the time and energy of the Catholic scholar; children must be loved, disciplined, taken to the doctor, supervised, put to bed, and fed. During pregnancy and after childbirth the wife needs help. Extra dependents often mean extra

hours of gainful employment, "moonlighting"; and this can impede scholarly development. It is humanly understandable if many of the family men who do obtain the doctorate end their productive scholarship then.

Some of the exchange of scholarship for children is deliberately chosen by these professors. Often the timing or the number of children is the result of the failure to practice rhythm spartanly or to the failure of the wife's cycle to act predictably. Large families are not the principal cause of our rather poor record in scholarship; but this is a factor which has been ignored or overly discounted in discussions of Catholic intellectual life.

NAME WITHHELD

"End of Session Three"

New York, N.Y.

TO THE EDITORS: As a Protestant, please let me thank you for your editorial "End of Session Three" [Dec. 4].

To be very frank, that last week caused us no little confusion and very much disappointment (especially in relation to the declaration on religious liberty).

I have read the Constitution *De Ecclesia* with much interest and some concern—the latter in relation to Pope Paul's public actions on the day of promulgation. It is far too early to tell how this Constitution will be implemented, but you can be sure that Protestant ecumenical leaders will be watching with expectation, hoping that there will be progressive practical consequences.

STANLEY I. STUBER

Clarification

Princeton, N. J.

TO THE EDITORS: I much appreciated Gregor Roy's careful and generous review of my book in your Fall Book Issue [*Peter the Venerable and Islam*, Oct. 23]. I should like to clarify one point raised in the review by insisting that I was not attributing to the papacy, in the passage he quoted, either mania or friendship towards the abbot of Cluny in 1145. I imagine Mr. Roy was as reluctant as I was to publicize the attitude and influence of an abbot of Clairvaux in this connection.

JAMES KRITZECK

AN APPEAL: A Salesian missionary seeks to build homes for twenty-three Indian leper families. Each house will cost \$30, a night-school building, \$100, a small chapel, \$250. With famine in the area he feeds three hundred and fifty people for 7¢ a day per person. He appeals for funds for his destitute charges. Donations for Father O. Montovani, S.D.B., should be sent to Salesian Missions, 148 Main St., New Rochelle, N.Y., or to him c/o Social Welfare Center, Fatima Church, Tambaram, Madras 45, South India. (Airmail: 25¢).

A Steady Focus on the Humane Consciousness

The Importance of Scrutiny. Ed. by Eric Bentley. New York University Press. \$7.

by Bernard McCabe

"SCRUTINY has not yet been given a fair hearing." Thus Professor Bentley, introducing his selections from that famous journal. Mr. Bentley wrote this in 1948, for the book under review first appeared briefly in that year as a Grove Press paperback. Well, since then *Scrutiny* has had quite a hearing. The whole series (1932-1953) has just been reprinted, for example. And its founder, F. R. Leavis, has been having quite a hearing, too.

We've heard him excoriating C. P. Snow for presuming to write novels, Professor Moore for presuming to edit D. H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot (perennially) for presuming to underestimate D. H. Lawrence, Bloomsbury, the British Council, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and especially those battered old stalking-horses, the British Sunday reviewers, who have been getting it in the neck loud and often.

Yet it hasn't really been a fair hearing; or Dr. Leavis hasn't been fair to himself. For nothing this fractious public figure can say detracts from the real achievement of his magazine. Nor can it shake a belief that the author of *The Common Pursuit*, *The Great Tradition*, *Revaluations* and *New Bearings* is the most important and influential critic to have appeared in England since Matthew Arnold.

Scrutiny's battle-cry throughout its twenty-one years of life was "standards." Its aim was to provide "amid the material pressures and dehumanizing complications of the modern world a focus of humane consciousness; a centre where, faced with the specializations and distractions in which human ends lose themselves, intelligence, bringing to bear a mature sense of values, should apply itself to the problems of civilization." This typical utterance (from an editorial included in this selection) was

in fact defining not the function of criticism, but the function of the university. Of course the two for Leavis are intimately related. At the center of a university should be an English department, a department concerned less with hermetic scholarship and aesthetic appreciation than with a disciplined critical endeavor in which literary studies constantly lead beyond themselves towards engagement with the "problems of civilization." No such university existed, no such English department; *Scrutiny* set itself to fill the gap.

Mr. Bentley concentrates largely on what was for Leavis the heart of the matter—the critical experience. An important essay on Matthew Arnold provides a useful short-cut to Leavis's main preoccupations: "We make our major judgments about poetry by bringing to bear the completest and profoundest sense of relative value that, aided by the work judged, we can focus from our total experience of life (which includes literature), and our judgment has intimate bearings on the most serious choices we have to make hereafter in our living."

Critical judgment—"sensitive response to delicate organizations of feeling"—could hardly be taken more seriously. And without a doubt Leavis's own greatest achievements lie in this direction. I am thinking particularly of those brief, intense analyses of short, crucial passages from, for example, a Keats *Ode*, Pope's *Moral Essays*, *Macbeth*, that turn up here and there in *Scrutiny*. They have the flavor of what one imagines Leavis's best classroom performances at Cambridge must have been like—the characteristically involuted prose presenting a muscular, flexible mind in full control.

Leavis's allusive intricacies demand comprehending and assenting responses from his readers. He insistently and deliberately addresses an audience which is presumed to share his values, his "focus of humane consciousness," or which is pressured to do so. Arnold could make similar

assumptions and exert similar pressures more blithely and fluently in the nineteenth century. Much more so could Dr. Johnson, with his confident appeal to the "common reader" in the eighteenth century (for Leavis a golden age, before the "epoch of dissolution and transformation" had set in). *Scrutiny* was devoted to developing and maintaining such an audience in the twentieth century.

Much of Leavis's work is now easily available and so is omitted here. But a short study of E. M. Forster, at once generous and discriminating, reveals Leavis at his best, as do his contributions to a debate with Rene Wellek on the relations between criticism and philosophy. In an interesting group of book-reviews we can watch *Scrutiny* coming to terms with contemporary work, charting a stern course through the puzzling shoals of the thirties and forties. The modish blandishments of the Left (what Roy Campbell used to sum up in the composite poet "MacSpaunday"), and of the Right (Eliot's Anglican devotees) are resisted with equal rigor, while Lawrence, Eliot and Yeats receive early and wise recognition. Joyce remains one great blind spot, though *Scrutiny* is right about *Finnegans Wake*. Other *Scrutiny* voices are heard: Knights, Harding, Mason, Traversi, Turnell, Speirs, Mellers—quite a team—impressive, apart from anything else, in the diversity of their interests.

Q. D. Leavis, who wrote admirably about Jane Austen in *Scrutiny*, turns up here nagging away at Virginia Woolf. Perhaps it is only fair that this side of the magazine should be thoroughly displayed—the *Scrutiny* hatchet-job. Dr. Leavis himself sometimes descends to strong-arm methods. I am not referring to his major revaluations of figures like Milton and Shelley (these statements demand, and sometimes have received, serious reappraisal by those writers' defenders) but to the occasions when this much-provoked critic allows poised irony to turn into hectoring

sarcasm, intelligent impatience into nervous irritability, sweetness and light into the dissidence of dissent.

And there are too many minor disciples who (no doubt to the intense irritation of the master) adopt the manner only. Critical backings and rejections become predictable, and so does the vocabulary; key terms like "enactment," "placing," "reverence for life," end up devaluated, rattling around in an atmosphere of bullying knowingness and coterie narrowness, a long way from Arnold's free play of intelligence. But this view has been much touted; indeed I only return to it in order to emphasize by contrast the immense service done for criticism in *Scrutiny's* efforts to rescue literary studies as a serious discipline. *Scrutiny* was and is important for all who accept Arnold's dictum that the quality of a man's life nowadays depends largely on the quality of what he reads.

St. Martin's Day?

Martin Luther. By John M. Todd. The Newman Press. \$5.75.

by Romaine L. Gardner

IT IS BECOMING increasingly popular in Lutheran circles these days to talk about the "tragic necessity" of the Reformation. It was tragic because the One True Church was rent into many opposing camps. It was necessary because the Roman Church was corrupt, and either would not or could not cleanse itself.

Lutherans, for generations, have stressed the corruption within the Church of Rome and thus the necessity of the Reformation, but only recently have they recognized its tragic consequences. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, have emphasized the tragic consequences of the Reformation, but have not been at all willing to consider its necessity. John M. Todd, in his book *Martin Luther*, raises the question of the necessity of the Reformation from the Catholic viewpoint, and if he is not convinced it was necessary, he at least sets forth the evidence on the basis of which Lutherans have been claiming it was.

The uniqueness of Mr. Todd's approach is not in rehearsing the moral

laxities within the Roman Church of the 15th Century. This has been done again and again by both Catholic and Lutheran historians. Every school boy has heard about the simony, sex and nepotism. Nor does the uniqueness of Mr. Todd's approach lie in a rehearsing of the calls for reform from Matthew of Cracow, Bishop of Worms, in his *Concerning the Filth of the Roman Curia* in 1403-4 to the Pontificate of Julius II and the Fifth Lateran Council of 1510, and the failure of the Church to put these reforms into effect.

The uniqueness of Mr. Todd's approach lies in his assertion that what the Church needed was not just moral, but theological reform, and to suggest that perhaps Luther's criticism of the Roman Catholic Church and the ensuing events were necessary to provide the impetus for such reform. The common belief that a soul could be rescued from purgatory by dropping a coin into the money chest and transferring the indulgence to that soul was not just an isolated theological confusion, but an indication of how seriously the theology of the Church was contradicted by the daily practice of the Church, the summit of an era which had subordinated moral theology to Canon Law, which had substituted mechanical practice for a concern about man's relationship to Christ.

Granted, then, the Church was in need of some kind of theological reform. What about the man, Luther, and the reform he instigated? In his explanation of the Eighth Commandment in the *Small Catechism*, Luther writes that "we should fear and love God, and not falsely belie, betray, backbite, nor slander our neighbor, but excuse him, speak well of him, and put the best construction on all he does." This advice is taken to heart by Mr. Todd in his discussion of Luther.

There have been attempts in the past by authors in the Catholic tradition "to put the best construction" on Luther's life and work. Karl Adam bemoans the fact that Luther left the Church, but has such a high regard for his religious sensitivity and intelligence that he contends, had Luther remained in the Church, he would have become the greatest

saint in Germany since St. Boniface. Yet there is still the "tract rack" picture of Father Martin as the vulgar, blasphemous, drunken, vow-breaking, sex-craving fanatic who broke with the One True Church only to satisfy his personal and political ambitions. Even if reform were necessary, such a story goes, this unreconstructed rebel would be the last person who could bring it about. It is this picture of Luther, the villain, which needs correcting within Catholicism, and Mr. Todd sets himself to correcting it.

What about the physical and mental predispositions of Luther brought out by recent writers like Erikson and Osborne? They are important, says Mr. Todd, but are not sufficient to "explain away" either the theological question Luther asked nor the answer he found. What about the coarseness of Luther's language? The Roman Curia itself could measure up to it. What about the savage statements of Luther during the Peasant uprising of 1525? Luther was under tremendous political pressure at the time and was himself politically inexperienced. Was Luther a political autocrat as even William Shirer claims? Luther's statements about "the priesthood of all believers" had a democratic effect. Was Luther a run-away friar who wanted an excuse to break his vow of celibacy? The manner and timing of his marriage in 1525, after he had been free from ecclesiastical authority for four and a half years denies it. Were the whole of Luther's achievements as perversely egocentric as Maritain asserted? Maritain's early book on the Reformer, Mr. Todd writes, is "an unhappy example of a great scholar stepping far outside the bounds of his own specialty."

In short: "The anti-Lutheran myth of the foul-mouthed German beast, barely in control of himself, will not hold together. In some of the early disputations between 1517 and 1519 eyewitnesses spoke of Luther's patience in debate, as well as of his outspoken phrases and the impressive nature of his rather ascetic features and his piercing eye. . . . If the picture will not hold together even for his public life, it becomes absurd for the home life. Luther becomes rather

more like a kind of Chesterton, jolly, cantankerous, obstinate, deep-drinking, expounding, contradicting, brilliant, human, adored, lovable, prayerful."

What about the sources of Luther's reform? Was Luther the innovator, the creator of a new religion? Was his doctrine of justification completely foreign to Catholic theology? A Lutheran must answer "no" to this question, for only if Luther was a Reformer, and not a radical innovator, do Lutherans have any claim to be a part of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. Mr. Todd finds the sources of Luther's doctrine in St. Paul and St. Augustine. He sees it as significant that Luther converted the whole University of Wittenberg to his theology by 1517 and was not accused of heresy. What Luther proposed, writes Mr. Todd, amounted to a biblical and existential re-statement of traditional theology, emphasizing all that had of recent years been played down. Luther's essential theology of justification and grace is not incompatible with, not absolutely contradictory to, Catholic tradition.

But why, then, the split? Why the excommunication? Why the failure to bring about a rapprochement between Luther and the Roman hierarchy? Mr. Todd's book tells the long and complicated story of one bungling episode after another which reads like a Greek tragedy, where we who sit above the action and look down upon it, wonder, if we had been there, and if the necessary reforms could have been made, whether today we would be celebrating another St. Martin's Day.

Larkin's Poetry

The Whitsun Weddings. By Philip Larkin. Random House. \$4.

by Rosemary F. Deen

PHILIP LARKIN is one of several intellectual, anti-establishment English poets, a group whose witty verse has been described as "both seductive and repulsive." For Mr. Larkin at least, this is truer as a first impression than as a characterization. Poems of understatement like his

require the reader to pause until the context takes shape. Poems as tightly constructed as "Faith Healing," "The Whitsun Weddings," "MCMXIV," "Ambulances," "Dockery and Son," and "An Arundel Tomb" don't really have any random, easy detail.

To begin with, Mr. Larkin's poems, both in *The Less Deceived*, published nine years ago, and in *The Whitsun Weddings*, combine strictness and even elegance of form with diminished—prosaic or downright ugly—subjects. The effect, however, is not dramatic, a Metaphysical violent yoking of opposites, but a Wordsworthian Romantic ingestion of subject.

Not that the subjects lose their proper actuality. The "bleached/ Established names on sunblinds," or the "smells of different dinners," are authentic and a witness to other truths in the poems. In general the poems start with a point of view: a train, a taxi, "my unsatisfactory prime," singleness, and then record honestly what is observed from this perspective. Sometimes there is an exchange of observations: from the train we see the people on the platform "watching us go/ As if out on the end of an event/ Waving goodbye/ To something that survived it." More often there is no exchange: old song scores, old photographs, maiden names, old tombs, all have a life in them that does not respond, like the ambulances which move, "giving back/ None of the glances they absorb." The poems find that:

Truly, though our element is time,
We are not suited to the long
perspectives

Open at each instant of our lives.
They link us to our losses: worse,
They show us what we have as it
once was,

Blindly undiminished, just as
though

By acting differently we could
have kept it so.

In fact, the long perspective goes back so far in some poems that it looks like predestination, as in this short poem, "As Bad As A Mile":

Watching the shield core

Striking the basket, skidding across
the floor,
Shows less and less of luck, and
more and more

Of failure spreading back up the
arm

Earlier and earlier, the unraised
hand calm,

The apple unbitten in the palm.

The losses are so exposed, the feeling so sharp—these and the painful dryness binding the elements—that the American sensibility wonders why feelings don't break out violently. Those poor, repressed British? Unlikely. Change is loss, but there is also "ready to be loosed . . . all the power/ That being changed can give." Perhaps this is the source of the power of the poems. It does more than keep the nostalgia from breaking out into sentimentality. There is a firm sense in the poems of the power to work. Difference may "prove me separate, not unworkable." We remember a wish Mr. Larkin had for a young girl in *The Less Deceived*:

Nothing uncustomary
To put you off your balance,
That, unworkable itself,
Stops all the rest from working.

These poems do work, do contain a life that gives back glances. There are of course, no claims made in the book. But the work aims not at disillusion but at an activity like that which the poet wished for the young girl: "skilled,/ Vigilant, flexible,/ Unemphasized."

Cook's Stew

The FBI Nobody Knows. By Fred J. Cook. Macmillan. \$5.95.

by Robert Kasanof

INSIDE every Liberal is a secret policeman trying to get out. The form of the fantasy translates itself into a picture of the ideal Federal agent as a man who listens to Orff, Cage and Janacek on FM, who spends his Saturday afternoons at the Martha Jackson gallery, and for whom the mysteries of sectarian left-

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ist politics are clear categories and a Trotskyite is poles away from a Lovestonite. He has been analyzed, does not repeat rumors and never uses a big, big D.

Alas, such is not to be, for the cruel reality is that there are criminals and real spies and blabbermouths in sensitive government jobs, and it is necessary that somebody investigate them. Fred Cook has undertaken to demonstrate in *The FBI Nobody Knows* that the organization presently performing that work is a danger to the free institutions of this country and that fear of reprisal stifles all criticism of the Bureau and particularly its director. J. Edgar Hoover has, of course, from time to time said some of the most ill-informed and medieval things about parole, probation and a variety of other public questions ever uttered by a government official. But it is a near miracle that our national investigative police force, under his direction, has performed as well as it has. Its agents do not take bribes, beat their prisoners, or perjure themselves on the witness stand, and from the public record the same cannot be said of most municipal forces or all the other federal law enforcement agencies. Although these are certainly minimum standards they are far from easy to achieve and it is to the FBI's credit that it has achieved them.

Mr. Cook is not and cannot be pleased. He wants to have it both ways. When Hoover opposes the idea of a National Crime Commission and criticizes one of Attorney General Kennedy's special crime groups:

"They had asked the FBI to assign special agents to the group 'to be used on 'fishing expeditions' but 'obviously, we have neither the manpower nor the time to waste on such speculative ventures.' Cook, suggesting that Hoover and the FBI are soft on crooks, lets him have it. 'His explanation ignored the obvious fact that if you don't embark on fishing expeditions you don't catch fish.'"

But when it comes to the painful problem of the post-war Communism and perjury trials, the shoe is apparently very tight on the other foot:

"Is it possible, under the intimidat-

tion (for it is nothing else) of FBI surveillance and security checks, to maintain free discussion, so vital in informing the people of the truth and thrashing out issues in a democracy? And can this democracy, any democracy, long tolerate this police intrusion into its intellectual life, into its freedoms?"

If Liberalism and Libertarianism die in the United States it will certainly be of self-inflicted wounds such as those delivered by Cook when he suggests in a succession of chapters that Alger Hiss was innocent and framed, and hints that the Communists conspired to convict the Rosenbergs and that the case against them was another frameup.

When the next McCarthy era comes, as it undoubtedly will, the Liberal community in the United States may not be saved by another *opera buffa* involving an army PFC, and it had better confront now the realistic need for security and intelligence activities and separate them from the meaningless hectoring and intimidation of assistant professors and army dentists, for if it ties the case for liberty to a mindless attack on all forms of police and intelligence activity the whole cause of freedom will be dragged down with the first proven spy.

People who should know better have already announced themselves in Mr. Cook's corner; Mark DeWolfe Howe, for example, says "I must confess that my dispositions are almost all in Mr. Cook's favor and that I doubt whether any error or exaggeration on his part will change the inclination of my mind." The recent presidential campaign has indicated that politicians of all stripes will soon be climbing aboard the law-and-order bandwagon, damning the courts, and calling for vigilante-style justice. They must be met with reasoned answers.

There is an important book to be written on the limitations of police power as it applies full spectrum from bookmakers to spies. *The FBI Nobody Knows* is not that book. It presents the same danger as an quack remedy—though it may itself be tasteless and harmless it defers the day of treatment, until perhaps too late.

Drama in Britain

The New British Drama. Edited by Henry Popkin. Grove. \$8.50.

by Sean Callery

"HE WANTED to teach us how to write and what we ought to act," Madame Arcadina, the aging actress of Chekhov's "The Seagull" angrily observes when subjected to a fragment of her son's advanced playlet. The Angry Young Men of the contemporary British Theater and their friends seem to intend no less and respect their elders not at all. This collection includes Shelagh Delaney's "A Taste of Honey," Brendan Behan's, "The Hostage," Arnold Wesker's "Roots," John Arden's "Serjeant Musgrave's Dance," N. F. Simpson's "One Way Pendulum," and "The Caretaker" by Harold Pinter. Directors Joan Littlewood and George Devine, playwrights Arnold Wesker and John Arden and the volume editor, Henry Popkin contribute essays of the "how it all happened" and "where we hope we are going" species.

Miss Littlewood insists that "in England, the infantile, snobbish theater which we have had for so long is showing obvious signs of decay and how the doors are opening to new talent. The talent was always there but in the England of ascendant imperialism, it was kept strictly in the workhouse." Whatever one thinks of Miss Littlewood's frankly partisan and class-oriented chronicle of the emergence of a certain kind of playwright, she and her colleagues have demonstrated rather conclusively that the customs, aspirations, lore, manners, problems etc., etc., of the English working class merit serious dramatists' inspection.

Nearly all of the plays seem curiously old fashioned—perhaps because the revolution came to the American and Continental Theatres several decades ago. Echoes of Odets, Sargant, O'Neill and Brecht abound and the passage of time has not sweetened the music, although it certainly has diminished the relevance of proletarian outrage.

"Roots" tells us of a country girl's coming of age; which is to say she

learns to think for herself after a lengthy tutelage by her Marxist boyfriend. Mr. Wesker's simple homily of the ignorant clod who becomes a human being through self-education and effort is considerably more effective and moving than the bare outline would suggest. But when the play is over, one is not at all certain that the newly emancipated girl is that much better off than the rest of her family, who are more or less contentedly gossiping and quarrelling within an easy sniff of the dung heap.

Of the ones less well-known over here: John Arden's "Serjeant Musgrave's Dance" is a rambling melange of prose and song, anti-militarism and anti-colonialism, and borrows a great deal from Brecht in style and contents; unfortunately its characters are didactic symbols, not people. N. F. Simpson's "One Way Pendulum," a very original farce, offers some sight gags worthy of the Marx Brothers, and some wonderfully insane dialogue spoofing the law in particular and society in general.


Americans are generally more familiar with the works of Harold

Pinter, especially "The Caretaker." Reading the text does not alter a rather negative impression of this curious play. Three lonely men fail to communicate with each other and their proximity seems to compound the loneliness. This looks like an attempt to say something about the human condition, but the characters remain stubbornly unilluminational—and unarresting.

In Brendan Behan's "The Hostage" and Shelagh Delaney's "A Taste of Honey" the authors' superb craft is merely the vehicle for expressing points of view and introducing people whose authenticity is immediately and vitally apparent.

"A Taste of Honey" is a real achievement by reason of its honest sentiment and great good humor. A brief review does not begin to suffice as an assessment of Brendan Behan's contribution to contemporary drama. His masterpiece "The Quare Fellow" is not included in this collection but "The Hostage" may be more representative of the author's way of looking at things and his literary style.

"The Hostage" is superficially a



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chaotic vaudeville, which nevertheless manages to tell a real story and elucidate Behan's outlook—at once that of the reformer and the tolerant observer, vastly amused by this own and his fellow man's petty vices.

Mr. Behan composed outrageously comic lyrics to traditional airs, which are sung by soldiers, bogus evangelists, procurers, prostitutes, a superbly foolish aristocratic revolutionary and a little girl from the country. The obsolescence of war, the subtle distinctions between religion and sanctimony, revolution and accompanying violence, the need for honest charity towards the homeless and despised—these are Behan's subjects. Moreover, the playwright practices what he preaches, his enemies are always anti-human forces, never men and women. In short, "The Hostage" is a triumph of the rarest kind: a hilarious comedy for an audience capable of serious attention and thought.

Order and Charge

Our Changing Constitution. By Charles Leedham. Dodd, Mead. \$5.

by Maurice Adelman

SINCE CRITICISM of the way the Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution is indulged in by so many politicians, attorneys, and pressure groups these days, it is a salutary exercise to read once again the document itself, as amended and modified. What is even more valuable is to read the history of the Constitution and the background leading to these changes and modifications. Charles Leedham, a freelance writer, gives the interested citizen this opportunity in a well-thought-out and useful book.

What Mr. Leedham has done in seventeen chapters is to trace briefly and succinctly the historical and political circumstances which led to the original document and the twenty-four formal amendments which have been made to it. The first three chapters deal with the original Constitution, the problems attendant on its ratification, and the first ten amendments, known as the Bill of Rights. Chapters four through sixteen deal individually with amend-

ments eleven through twenty-four respectively. The last chapter deals with proposed amendments which have never become ratified.

This volume has particular value for the ordinary reader who wants to refresh his recollection of a vital part of American political life. It is written with a minimum of the author's own prejudices and feelings although it is not too difficult to ascertain, for example, Mr. Leedham's views on the wisdom of the Prohibition Amendment or the longevity of the Two-Term Amendment. The brevity necessary in such a work as this results in an overemphasis on the fact of the Dred Scott decision as a cause of the Civil War without sufficient emphasis on the other causes of the War, or on the legal thought which went into the opinions, not only of Chief Justice Taney but of the other judges, most of whom wrote their own separate opinions.

Here and there the author's generalizations do not appear to be valid in the light of political history as we know it. For example, in a discussion of the electoral college, Mr. Leedham

states that the electoral votes of the state go to the presidential choice of the party of the electors. While this is generally true and while both parties hope and expect this, the author should have noted the defection in recent elections of certain Democratic electors who have voted for a person other than their party's choice for President. And, in speaking of lame-duck congressmen, the author seems to regard a defeat as congressman as a permanent retirement from elective office. This has been the case in many instances, but one can think rather easily of many congressmen who have been elected again after having been defeated in an attempt to retain a congressional seat.

For the professional reader, this book lacks any documentation as to sources or references to legal cases cited therein. In addition there is no bibliography or statement of sources. While Mr. Leedham has appeared to use regularly available sources, he has not relied on any hitherto unknown documents. However, the lack of identification of some of the quotations is annoying.

In sum, this book is brief, useful, and non-partisan in setting out the history of a document, the interpretation of which exercises many thoughtful people today. For all its qualities, it does not add much light on the question of whether or not such matters as apportionment of state legislatures or the limits, if any, of the First Amendment on state regulation of movies or school prayers are properly within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution or the legislators who have subsequently amended it.

REVIEWERS

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